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Welcome to Pandora's Box for 1996. This year's collection again features 
contributions from authors exploring a diverse range of issues affecting 
women, the law and society. Far from providing a source of extensive 
troubles we hope the Box this year will again provoke thought on the gifts 
contained within - issues ranging from continuing education for the 
judiciary to laws affecting women in Pakistan and a discussion of th� body 
as property. Copyright remains with the authors, italicised introductions are 
merely editorial and the viewpoints expressed are personal to the authors. 
The editors would like to thank Georgine Duncan, WATL President, for her 
vital support in the unearthing of contributions, Warren Lee for technical 
support and Kirsty Dixon for her brilliant artwork. WATL gratefully 
acknowledges and appreciates the financial support of the Queensland Law 
Society, Gadens Ridgeway and Butterworths. We would particularly like to 
give thanks to our contributors who make the Box possible by generously 
allowing us to publish their work. Finally, of course, to you, the reader, for 
your interest and support. 
Enjoy! 
Andrea Lee & Usha Praser 
Editors 
August 1996. 
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JUDICIAL AWARENESS TRAINING 
The Honourable Catherine A. Fraser, Chief Justice of Alberta presented this paper at the Australian 
Legal Convention in September 1995. Chief Justice Fraser advocates the importance of awareness 
training for the judiciary on social context issues including gender, racial equality and justice and the 
identification and resolution of inequality, bias and discrimination in order to ensure the justice 
system operates fairly and equally .  Among the reasons proposed as to why it is necessary that judges 
benefit from awareness training about other values, cultures and perspectives is a recognition that 
judges make law, not just 'find it' and in doing so often weigh or choose competing values rather than 
precedents . .  
1. INTRODUCTION 
As we approach the next century, the Canadian judiciary is in the midst of an era of fundamental 
change. The changes which we have witnessed during the past decade are not just a matter of 
optics, but of substance and process. The changes have affected many aspects of the judiciary the 
method of selection and appointment of its members; its composition; its average age; its role; its 
relationship to the public and government and its recogntion of hte importance of judicial 
education on social context issues. These changes have been driven by many forces: the public's 
desire for the judiciary to be more representative of the community it serves and more in contact 
ewith contemporary values and mores; the need for the justice system to respond positively to 
wide spread concerns about systemic discrimination; the increasing law making role imposed upon 
the judiciary because of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 and recognition by judges 
themselves that law is often about choosing values rather than choosing precedents. 
What has all this meant? First, it has meant that all of us involved in the administration of justice in 
Canada have been challenged to consider how best to accommodate the public's legitimate 
concerns about the justice system while still preserving the core value in it judicial independence. 
And as public concerns have been voiced about access to justice, we have been forced to address 
these questions :  Is our justice system accessible? What do we mean by access to justice? Are we 
more concerned with rules and procedures than with justice itself? And most importantly, we have 
been challenged to rethink the very nature of law itself, its functions and its purposes . Whose 
interests do the laws serve; whose understandings and experiences do they reflect; whose values 
are being promoted and how fair is our legal system?2 
Why are Canadians concerned about these questions? The answer is a simple one. We are trying to 
ensure that our system of justice is an inclusive one. To be inclusive, it must be fair and equal. And 
to be fair and equal, it must do more than meet the needs and concerns of any one group in society 
because access to justice involves more than just serving those for whom the system already works 
well. If we fail in this task; if the public ' s  expectations for fair and equal justice do not match the 
reality of the delivery of justice and the gap between the two cannot be explained on some credible 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConsitutionAct 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(U.K.) ,  c . 1 1  herein referred to as the Charter. 
2 For an excellent discussion of some of these issues , see Kathleen Mahoney, "Gender Issues in the Legal System: Is there a 
Level Playing Field?", (keynote address at Family and Conciliation Courts Annual Conference in Montreal , May, 1995) [To be 
published in Family and Conciliation Courts Review] .  
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basis, then we risk a loss of confidence and trust. And without public confidence and trust in the 
administration of justice, who will accede to the rule of law? 
How does one achieve an inclusive system of justice? One way is to ensure that the selection 
process for appointment to the Bench provides the government with a wide variety of candidates 
with a broad spectrum of viewpoints and experience. Fortunately, the legal profession offers a 
wonderful supply of potential candidates from which to choose. Accordingly, we must make every 
effort to ensure that this heterogenous range of talent is represented on the Bench. 
Another way to achieve an inclusive system of justice is to ensure that judges make decisions 
acting from a position of full knowledge and understanding. Judicial education for members of the 
Bench on social context issues will help guarantee the confidence of the public in the process and 
will also provide a just result in individual cases. After all, well thought out judicial education 
programs are part of the continuum of legal education which begins with law school and continues 
throughout one's legal career. These programs should be designed not only to allow judges to 
keep current in all areas of the law but also to fil in gaps in knowledge of other peoples and 
cultures and to deepen understandings. 
In the face of these challenges, judges in Canada are taking positive steps, including judicial 
education programs, to examine their role and to improve their understanding of difficult social 
issues. The Canadian Judicial Council (which consists of all Chief Justices of the superior courts 
across Canada) has committed itself to the concept of comprehensive, credible and in depth social 
context education for all of Canada's judges on issues such as gender equality, racial equity and 
aboriginal rights. 3 
The purpose of this paper is to outline some of my personal observations about judicial awareness 
training or what is sometimes called social context education. I freely acknowledge that other 
people's experiences , and conclusions, may well have been different than mine, I have played 
numerous roles in the justice system as law student ,  articling student, lawyer, lecturer in a 
Faculty of Law, corporate counsel, chair of a labour relations tribunal, trial judge, appellate judge 
and now Chief Justice. While in private practice, I was actively involved in legal education. Since 
my appointment to the Bench, I have focussed considerable attention on judicial education. In that 
context, I have been a participant, lecturer, organiser and designer of judicial education. I currently 
serve as the Chair of the Judicial Education Committee for the Canadian Judicial Council. As 
Chief Justice of Alberta, I have attempted to create a climate of enthusiasm for the concept of 
social context education amongst Canada's judiciary. Until this past spring, I had the privilege of 
serving as a member of the Council's Special Committee of Equality in the Courts. 
In order to provide a foundation and context for judicial awareness training, I shall first briefly 
review the various forms of discrimination that exist. Second I will discuss why judges benefit 
form awareness training. Third, I will address some of the barriers to this type of judicial 
education. And finally, I will outline some important considerations that could usefully be taken 
into account in designing a model of judicial education for social context issues. 
3 The Special Committee on Equality in the Courts has been charged with the responsibility of implementing Council's 
resolution calling for social context education. 
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Il. TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION 
One of the purposes of judicial awareness training is to teach judges to identify and deal with 
inequality, different forms of bias and various types of discrimination. Although these concepts 
have been invoked for many years, the content and contour of them have changed over time. In 
recent years, there have been significant jurisprudential developments in Canada in identifying and 
classifying various forms of discrimination and demonstrating how discrimination violates the 
concept of equality.4 
As a result, discrimination is now a much larger concept than some would credit. It is critical that 
those involved in the legal system understand the various forms that discrimination might take. 
That is because it is difficult to confirm that something exists when one does not know what to 
look for. 
While this paper will focus on gender issues, the focus is for metaphorical purposes only. The 
analysis applies equally to other disadvantaged groups including those seeking racial equity, 
aboriginal justice, and equality for persons with disabilities. 
Not every distinction which the law makes is discriminatory. Under Canadian law, discrimination 
involves adverse treatment, disadvantage and improper burdens. In the leading case in Canada on 
this issue, Law Society of British Colombia v Andrews5, discriminations was defined as: 
... a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the 
individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such 
individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withhold to limits access to opportunities, benefits, 
and advantages available to other members of society. 6 
Discrimination takes many forms: direct discrimination, adverse effect or indirect discrimination 
and systemic discrimination. Direct discrimination is very clear and recognisable. It occurs when 
someone adopts a rule or practice or makes a comment which singles out the target group for 
discriminatory treatment on a prohibited ground. For example, "No Catholics or no women or no 
blacks employed here."7 Direct discrimination includes the unconscious use of stereotypes to 
attribute to individuals characteristics which those individuals do not possess but which they 
supposedly have by reason of membership in a certain class. 
Adverse effect , or indirect, discrimination occurs when a rule or standard is adopted which is 
supposedly neutral but has a disproportionate adverse effect on one or more classes of persons. 8 A 
good example of this is where an employer offers employment to a person in a wheelchair without 
4 See Andrews v Law Society of British Colombia ( 1989) 1 SCR 143; Alberta (Human Rights Commission) v Central Alberta 
Dairy Pool ( 1990) 2 SCR 489; Robichaud v Canada (Treasury Board) ( 1987) 2 SCR 84; Action Travail des Femmes v Canada 
(Canadian Human Rights Commission) ( 1987) 1 SCR 1 1 14; R v Turpin ( 1989) 48 CCC (3d) 8 (SCC); Brooks v Canada 
Safeway Ltd ( 1 989] 1 SCR 1219; Thibaudeau v Canada (25 May 1995) 24 154 SCC; Egan v Canada (25 May 1995) 23636 SCC 
and Miron v Trudel (25 May 1995) 22744 (SCC). 
5 ( 1989) 1 SCR 143 
6 Ibid.I at 174 
7 Ontario Human Rights Commission and O' Malley v Simpsons Sears at al, ( 1985) 2 SCR 536 at 55 1. 
8 Ibid. This case established that even though an employer might have a good business reason for a practice or policy, it could 
still be discriminatory if it had a disproportionate and prejudicial effect on particular people because of a prohibited ground of 
discrimination. 
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having a ramp available to permit the necessary access.9 Or where laws designed to "protect" 
women from late night work used to be used as justification for not hiring women in certain 
workplaces. 
Systemic discrimination is the most difficult to identify because it is so deeply embedded in 
existing structures that often it is simply seen as "the way things are" 10 Perhaps one of the best 
examples of systemic discrimination were the rules developed (many of which were judge made) 
to deal with complaints of sexual assault by women. Under the doctrine of recent complaint, an 
adverse inference could be drawn from the failure of a women to raise an immediate hue and cry. 
The doctrine of corroboration required that, unless there was corroborating evidence available, the 
judge had to warn a jury about the dangers of convicting an accused solely on the basis of the 
complainant' s  testimony. 11 Madam Justice Claire L'Heureux Dube of the Supreme Court of 
Canada has questioned these rules of evidence: 
For a long time, these rules of evidence were cloaked with colour of reason and accepted without question. 
Students were told that the rules were necessary because of the nature of sexual crimes . . . .  Why was 
credibility more of an issue in this area of law where complainants were mostly women? It is clear that, 
with respect to allegations of sexual assault, the rules came from the belief that women were not 
trustworthy: laws were required to protect men from the ever present false charge of rape. Such stererJtypes 
need to be examined in light of the realities surrounding sexual assault .12 
Of course, today the most egregious laws and common law principles have now been abrogated. 
But the problem is that it is not that easy to eliminate a number of the myths and misconceptions 
surrounding sexual offences. And one must bear in mind that these can trap not only judges and 
lawyers, but of equal importance, members of the jury. After all in assessing the credibility of a 
complainant' s allegations, triers of fact will necessarily test that evidence against what they 
consider to be "credible" and "probable" in the circumstances. It is here that the theory of the non
gender biased law and the reality of its application may well part ways. 
III. WHY JUDGES BENEFIT FROM JUDICIAL AWARENESS TRAINING 
Many reasons exist for the judiciary to seize the initiative and pursue awareness training on social 
context issues, including gender, racial equity and aboriginal justice. There is the need to ensure 
that our justice system operates fairly and equally; the need to ensure that judges do not rely on 
improper myths and stereotypes; the recognition that because judges make law, they must be 
9 Another example of the duty to provide reasonable accommodation can be found in Re Saskatchewan Human Rights 
Commission and Canadian Odeon Theatres Ltd. (1 985) 1 8  DLR (4th)93(Sask. CA),  leave to appeal refused June 3, 1985. In 
this case, a theatre owner was required to make the theatre accessible to those in wheelchairs so that they could view movies 
without having to be placed at the very front of the movie theatre. 
10 It was described by Chief Justice Dickson in Action Travail des Femmes v Canada [ 1 887] 1 SCR 1 1 14 at 1 1 39: In other 
words , systemic discrimination in an employment context is discrimination that results from the simple operation of established 
procedures of recruitment, hiring and promotion, none of which is necessarily designed to promote discrimination. The 
discrimination is then reinforced by the very exclusion of the disadvantaged group because the exclusion fosters the belief, both 
within and outside the group, that the exclusion is the result of "natural" forces , for example, that women 'just can't do the 
job" . 
11  This rule was abolished as of January 4, 1983 as regards complainants in sexual offences (s.246.4 of the Criminal Code), but 
it was not until January 1 ,  1988 that the rule was abolished with respect to child witnesses giving unswom evidence. Judges 
continue however to retain the discretion to charge the jury on the danger of convicting on the complainant's evidence alone: 
See R v Vetrovec (1982) 67 CCC (2d) 1 (SCC) in which Dickson J indicated that if the trial judge considers the witness 
trustworthy, then no warning is necessary. 
12 L'Heureux-Dube, J "Beyond the Myths: Justice", (Address to the Canadian Har Association, Family Law Section, April, 
1 994)[Unpublished] at 2-3 
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aware of other values, cultures and perspectives; the recognition that this knowledge is also 
required because in making law, judges often weigh or choose competing values; the need to 
ensure that judges understand the context in which law operates because equality is a 
constitutional norm; the fact that this context is also important because equality principles are 
infusing the common law and finally the fact that judicial awareness training is new for most 
judges. 
1. Fair and Equal Justice System 
The single most important reason why judges need awareness training is for the reason that I have 
already identified the justice system of any country must treat its citizens fairly and equally. Why 
is equality important? 
The answer to this question offers both the root of out philosophy and the inspiration to strive for change. 
In my opinion, our desire for equality stems from our desire for justice and, quite frankly, inequality � 
injustice. Form inequality and injustice flows oppression. Oppression has no role in the society which we 
are trying to mould for the future.13 
As I have indicated earlier, we are striving to ensure that our justice system operates in a fair and 
equal manner. However, considerable information has been compiled indicating that there are 
problems with gender and racial bias in the Canadian justice system. There have been no less that 
57 national, provincial and territorial reports, studies and articles on gender bias and the law, 
which document the concerns of the aboriginal communities about the justice system and 8 which 
investigate the effects of racial bias in the Canadian legal system14• The need for judicial 
awareness education on social context issues is widely recognised in these materials and it is 
particularly interesting that a significant number of suggest that such education should be 
mandatory. 
I note that the Australian government recently released a report on Access to Justice: An Action 
Plan. I understand that this report outlines three key objectives for reforming the Australian justice 
system: :equality of access to legal services, national equity and equality before the law regardless 
of race, ethnic origins, gender or disability. 1 5  
Bias can manifest itself in different ways, some of which are not easy to identify. Dr Sheilah 
Martin mentions a number of these in the context of gender bias, but the thoughts expressed apply 
equally to bias against other disadvantaged groups: 
Gender bias includes the exclusion of women because they are women, the improper use of incorrect and 
unchosen stereotypes, the use of double standards, the use of a male defined norm, the failure to 
incorporate or be sensitive to the perspectives of women, not recognising or valorising women's harms 
because they are done to women, being gender blind to gender specific realities, and using sexist 
language. 16 
13 L'Heureux'Dube, J For Richer or for Poorer, Til Death Do Us Part? The evolving Role of Equality in Family Law", 
(Address to the Canadian Bar Association, Family Law Division, Calgary, May 18, 1995)[Unpublished] at 2. 
14 See for example Western Judicial Education Centre, Racial, Ethnic and Cultural Equity (Vancouver: Legal Education Society 
of British Colombia, (1992); and Four/Level Government/African Canadian Community Working Group, Towards A New 
Beginning, The Report and Action Plan of the Four Level Government/African Canadian Community Working Group 
(November, 1992). 
15 Livingston Armytage' "Judicial Education on Equality", (1995) 58 Modem Law Review 160 at 167 
16 Dr Sheilah Martin, "Proving Gender Bias in the Law and Legal System" in Joan Brockman and Dorothy E Chunn, eds., 
(Thompson Educational Publishing Inc.: Toronto, 1993) 19 at 24 25. 
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It is important for people in positions of authority in the justice system to understand the daily 
experiences of others unlike themselves. For example, what must it feel like to experience racism? 
For many people, that is an unknown. But through judicial education, it is hoped that judges wil 
maintain the empathy necessary to understand the negative effects of racism on the lives of the 
people subjected to it. This is not an easy task. Perhaps one of the best articles that has been 
written about putting oneself in another' s shoes is by Peggy Mcintosh. In it she speaks about the 
"knapsack" of "white privilege": 
White privilege is like an invisible ,weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, 
visas, clothes, tools and blank cheques . . .  
I was taught t o  see racism only in individual acts of meanness, not i n  invisible systems conferring 
dominance on my racial group.17 
Here are just some of the 26 privileges that Mcintosh classifies as aspects of her white privilege: 
she can move into housing she has chosen and be pretty sure her neighbours will be neutral or 
pleasant to her; she can turn on the TV or open the newspaper and see people of her ethnicity 
widely and positively represented; she can speak in public to a powerful male group without 
putting her ethnicity on trial. She does not have to educate her children to be aware of systemic 
racism for their own daily protection; she can swear, dress poorly or not answer letter, without 
having people attribute those choices to the bad morals, poverty or lack of literacy of her ethnicity; 
she can criticise the government without being seen as a cultural outsider; she can worry about 
racism without being scorned as self interested or self seeking; and she can remain oblivious to the 
language and customs of people of colour , who constitute the world' s  majority, without feeling 
any penalty for such oblivion.1 8  
The inequalities that have been identified in the various reports, studies and articles commenting 
on Canada' s  justice system touch upon every level of the legal process; constitutional norms; 
legislative statements; judicial interpretation; common law principles; rules of evidence; assessment 
of "relevance"; what qualifies as legal argument; and what is accepted as "evidence". Even 
something as supposedly objective as fact finding has been the subject of scrutiny. Understanding 
the values, beliefs and perspectives of other races and cultures and the opposite sex is particularly 
important when one considers the way in which the trier of fact' s  fact finding role can be affected 
by cultural and gender differences. Nowhere is this more critical than in the area of credibility of 
witnesses: "There is a body of literature which suggests that, even in a court of law, women 
witnesses are often accorded less credibility and are seen as less authoritative that male 
witnesses. 19  
Language barers also make communication extremely difficult. For example, there is no 
equivalent concept in Inuktitut (one of the official languages in the Northwest Territories) for 
"Guilty or Not Guilty". This is translated as "You 've done it or you haven 't", which is not the 
same thing. 20 
17 Peggy Mcintosh, "White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack" (1989 July/August) , Peace and Freedom, Bimonthly 
Journal of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, based at 1213 Race St. , Philadelphia, P.A. 19107 
18 Ibid. 
19 Supra, note 18 , at 28 ,  citing Norma J Wilder, "Credibility in the Courtroom: Does Gender Make a Diference", in materials 
prepared by the Western Judicial Education Centre for a conference held in Yellowknife on June 23-29, 1991. 
20 Barriers to Access to Justice (Summer 1995) V :3 Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice Newsletter 1 at 7 .  
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All of these issues raise a duty on the part of the justice system to listen and to consider the merit 
of the concerns raised. As part of a justice system committed to fairness and equality, the judiciary 
ought to assume responsibility for responding positively to legitimate public criticism. One way to 
do so is through judicial awareness training. 
2. Elimination of Myths and Stereotypes 
For judges, and for that matter lawyers, to prevent improper reliance on myths and stereotypes 
requires a complete understanding of what these stereotypes are, where they come from, and how 
one can distance one's self from those that are harmful and discriminatory. A stereotype is used 
when an individual is not judged on the basis of his or her own capabilities and capacities but on 
the basis of ascribed group characteristics. 
"Whatever we call them: myths, beliefs, assumptions, perspectives ... we all have them, and they 
shape the way that we see and understand the world23 • " This is not to say that there is anything 
inherently wrong with having certain beliefs, assumptions or perspectives. There is not. They form 
the way in which we view events, people and the world around us. But what must be understood 
is that some assumptions, especially those in the stereotypical category, may well be unfair and 
harmful. An example is the way that some view spousal support obligations. 
Say the word "alimony", and one of the common cultural stereotypes that springs to mind is 
of the money-hungry ex-wife. She could work, but doesn't want to get a job, and now she is 
trying to squeeze him for every penny he is worth . At the divorce settlement, a decent 
alimony will leave him working his fingers to the bone to pay for her extravagant and 
undeserved styles of life. 
The reality of course is that very few cases fit with this myth . . .  Divorce and its economic 
consequences have played a devastating role in the feminisation of poverty . 24 
Of course, every person is a complex mixture of views, beliefs, instincts, emotions, habits and 
ideas. The challenge for a judge is to understand one's own as well as those of the litigants before 
making a decision. Otherwise, as Patrick Devlin has suggested, a judge's biases may lead him or 
her to "mould" the facts of a case and thereby arrive at a decision based on an understanding that 
does not �orrespond entirely to reality. 
When I speak of him [the judge] as moulding the facts, I do not mean that he deliberately 
turns them to the shape he wants. I am thinking of the way in which the story as he listens to 
it takes shape in his mind. The inflow mixes with what is there already and it is out of the 
mixture that the shape grows. What is there already is an accumulation of experience 
including tendencies, prejudices, and maybe bias.25 
What I am suggesting, therefore, is that judges must continually evaluate their underlying 
assumptions to test for the presence of improper myths or stereotypes. 
3. Judges Make Law, Not Just Find It 
The mechanical approach to law, as evidenced in the teachings of Austin and Blackstone, rejects 
the notion that judges make law. The proponents of this view believe that judges only interpret 
Zl Supra, note 12 at 1. 
21 Supra, note 12 at 5. 
25 Patrick Devlin, The Judge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) at 91. 
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law. Hence, what judges might think; what their perspectives might be; what their knowledge of 
other races and other cultures and the other gender might be are all irrelevant to the judicial 
decision making role. 
I do not agree. The fact is that judges both make law and interpret the law. They apply the 
common law precedents, but they also have a law making role. In addition, in Canada, judges now 
have a significant law making role as defenders of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.26 That role has led to increasing public scrutiny of 
judicial decisions, why they are made and the personalities that lie behind the people making the 
decisions. It has also brought home to Canadians the fact that judges make law. 
Prior to this stage, the judges' law making role, though it existed, was not as evident. The 
prevailing view was that judges did not make law, but only found it. This phenomenon is not 
limited to countries with an enshrined Charter or Bill of Rights. Even in the United Kingdom, 
where there is still Parliamentary supremacy, a member of the judiciary has acknowledged that this 
theoretical model of jurisprudence is fallacious. Lord Reid rejected the notion that judges simply 
declare the law: 
"Those with a taste for fairy tales seem to have thought that in some Aladdin's cave there is 
hidden the common law in all its splendour and that on a judge's appointment there descends 
on him knowledge of the magic words 'open sesame.' Bad decisions are given when judges 
muddle their passwords and the wrong doors open. But we do not believe in fairy tales 
anymore. "27 
Society's script has a lot of parts. We are all players and everyone ought to have the opportunity 
to speak his or her lines and be heard. Because judges not only "find the law in precedent, but 
also "create" law, judges must ensure that they have heard all the dialogue before they make their 
decisions. To be rational, and make informed choices, we must understand. We must respect 
diversity, and strive to overcome our own limitations and biases. 
4. Making Law Involves Choosing Values 
Nor is it any answer to say that judges need not have any broad knowledge of the values of other 
races, cultures and the opposite sex because values are irrelevant in judicial decision making. The 
reality today is that law is just as much about choosing values as it is about choosing precedents. 
This is particularly so as one moves up the judicial chain to the appellate level which is concerned 
not just with its error correcting function but also with its law making function. Today, more 
than ever because of the Charter, judges are called upon to weigh and balance competing values in 
reaching decision. But arguably, this has always been so. 
Consider the following examples, and you will see how difficult it is to say that these judges 
were not reaching legal conclusions based on their understanding of, or sympathy or 
antipathy for, current social values: 
The judge who in 1 873 said "the paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfil the 
noble and benign offices of wife and mother"; the judge who in 19 15  thought admitting 
women to the legal profession would be a "manifest violation of the law of...public decency"; 
the judge who said in 1905 that fault-based support laws were desirable because wives "ought 
26 Supra, note 1. 
ZT "The Judge as Lawmaker" 1972 12 JSPTL 22. 
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to be preserved from imminent temptation"; ... the courts that said in 1949 that sanctity of the 
contract and restrictive covenants took precedence over the rights of Jews to purchase 
property; and the court that said in 1939 that freedom of commerce took precedence over the 
rights of blacks to be served beer; not to mention the entire history of the common law. 
That was all lawmaking, it was all weighing and applying values and policy, and it was all 
before the Charter.28 
Dr. Sheilah Martin, Dean of Law at the University of Calgary, has expressed a similar thought: 
Most modem legal theorists recognise that law is about making choices between competing 
interests and support the idea that the law is not politically neutral in its orientation or 
operation .. .Individuals must be able to see the possibility of other choices before they can be 
asked to bear the personal responsibility for the choices they do make.29 
For these reasons, judges cannot ignore the fact that in all areas of law, values often influence the 
decision making process.  That is why an understanding of the values of others and an awareness 
of how one's values affect the judicial decision making process are key to judicial fairness. 
5. Equality is a Constitutional Norm 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3° guarantees equality right to al Canadians. Since 
the Charter is part of the Constitution Act, 1982, the equality guarantees form part of the supreme 
law of Canada. This means for example, that gender and racial equality are mandated by the law 
they are not simply the desire of some "pressure group. "  Achieving gender equality and racial 
equity involves more than sanitizing one's language. As one academic has suggested, "It is not 
hard to imagine that those who perceive that the problem is restricted to the use of inappropriate 
language wil have difficulty constructing a program of judicial education that goes into 
substantive areas of law and questions basic legal principles. The articulation of these educational 
goals should be consistent with equality guarantees and the legitimate public expectation of a 
more inclusive justice system. "31 
Not only is judicial awareness training important because of the Charter guarantees of equality, it 
is also important because of the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada has directed that 
equality rights are to be enforced. Specifically, the Supreme Court requires that courts use a 
contextual approach to equality issues. This approach was set out in the decision of Justice 
Mcintyre in Andrews v. Law Society of British Colombia.32 The Court stated that equality issues 
may involve "a determination which is not to be made only in the context of the law which is 
subject to challenge but rather in the context of the place of the group in the entire social, political 
and legal fabric of our society. "33 
What does a contextual approach to equality mean? 
28 Abella, J.A., "Appellate Judicial lawmaking: Ten Realities of the Judicial Role", Quebec City (Canadaian Appellate Count 
Seminar, April 27 , 1995) [Unpublished] at 2 3. 
29 Supra, note 18 at 20 21. 
30 Supra note 1. 
31 This statement is attributable to Dr. Sheilah Martin, Dean of Law, University of Calgary. 
32 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
33 Ibid at 152. 
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A contextual equality analysis will include a review of the impact of particular practices on 
protected individuals and groups: "consideration must be given to the content of the law, to 
its purpose, and its impact upon those to whom it applies, and also upon those whom it 
excludes from its application."  The focus is on the effect of a rule or practice, 
acknowledging the varied life circumstances of disadvantaged people, with the goal of 
providing each with what he or she needs to have equal rights. 
A contextual approach also requires a review of the place of the group in Canadian society 
and the prior response of the legal system to that place ... Decision-makers are asked to take 
into account whether or not the individual is part of a group which has a history of 
exclusion; the source, frequency and form of any types of discrimination, any special laws 
which impose disadvantageous treatment...,any political marginalization, the complex 
causes of social inequality and a clear sense of the inherent dignity of all people.34 
Accordingly, judges must have some understanding of the social and economic contexts in which 
inequality arises for different groups in our society. For example, if the issue pertained to gender, 
a contextual analysis would require that attention be paid to the social context of women's lives 
and a consideration of how certain laws have treated men and women unequally in the past.35 This 
being so, it will be evident why judicial awareness training on gender and racial issues would be of 
considerable benefit. To understand context and assess whether there has been a breach of 
equality guarantees, judges must understand people and powerlessness: in particular the protected 
class or group, their values, the reality of their lives and the relationship of that group to other 
groups in our society. 
6. Equality Principles are Informing the Common Law 
Though it is true that in Canada, equality is a constitutional norm, it is also an intellectual 
imperative if confidence and trust in our justice system are to be maintained. For that reason, even 
though calls for equality have crystallized in Canada in the adoption of constitutional equality 
guarantees, that does not mean that the equality principles only has application because of the 
Charter. What has been most interesting about the evolution of equality rights post Charter has 
been the extent to which the equality principle has pollinated other areas of the law, including the 
common law. Therefore, with or without the Charter, the principles of equality would dictate the 
need for judges to enhance their knowledge of a broad spectrum of social context issues. 
7. Judicial Awareness Training Is New For Judges 
One final reason that judges benefit from awareness training is the simple reason that one cannot 
be sure they received it anywhere else before being appointed to the Bench. This type of education 
has not traditionally been the focus of law school education and most certainly, it has not been 
the focus of training as a lawyer since most lawyers' education focuses exclusively on traditional 
substantive law topics and issues of practice and process.  While this is now changing, the fact is 
that the judges of today did not receive the kind of social context education that law schools now 
believe is an important component of a lawyer's education. 
IV. BARRIERS TO JUDICIAL AWARENESS TRAINING 
34 Dr. Sheilah Martin, "An Introduction to Equality Rights Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms", (University 
of Calgary, April 1995) [Unpublished] at 44 45, quoting from Andrews v. Law Society of British Colombia, supra note 32 at 
168. 
35 Ibid at 12. 
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As important as the reasons are for judicial training, there exists a number of barriers which must 
be overcome if the judiciary is to respond positively to calls for judicial education on social 
context issues. Otherwise, education efforts could prove counterproductive and instead build 
resistance and resentment. The barriers to judicial awareness training are multifaceted and 
complex. Some are theoretical, others ideological and still others are methodological. And, in 
some instances, the barriers are deeply rooted in views of judicial roles and responsibilities which 
remain the subject of debate and discussion to this day. In my experience, these bariers include 
denial, lack of information, fear of compromise of judicial independence, fear of "special interest" 
groups, fear of admitting imperfection, belief that it would make courts too political, expecting 
unanimity from minority groups, the reluctance to examine closely held personal values; and 
institutional pressures. 
1. Denial 
Without question, the single biggest impediment to the concept of judicial awareness training is 
denial denial of judges as well as lawyers, that there is discrimination in the manner in which the 
law operates; denial that it "happens here", wherever that might be; denial that judges or lawyers 
have anything to do with creating, compounding or maintaining discrimination in the law; denial 
that it is the responsibility of the judiciary or the legal profession to eliminate it; and denial that 
judicial awareness training is an important strategy in ending it. Attempts to address the problem 
of gender and race bias in the justice system are rendered more difficult by those denials. In fact, 
denial is a show stopper: it effectively ends the discussion. 
Others, who are prepared to admit that judges may be biased, in the sense of having certain 
perspective of life, take the view that a judge can put " biases" out of his or her mind and decide a 
case simply on the facts. David Pannick represents the latter way of thinking. In his book, 
Judges,36 he acknowledges that at one time there were some judges whose decisions were 
influenced by their bias, but he asserts that today " such partiality no longer stains the Bench. "37 
Indeed in Pannick's view, a "judge who considers himself unable to decide a case impartially for 
other reasons will not sit in judgment. "38 However, what he overlooks is that one of the difficulties 
in overcoming one's own cultural or gender blindness is that it may not be obvious even to the 
person involved. 
These various forms of denial are, in a sense, effective distancing strategies which people 
sometimes use to avoid having to acknowledge the existence of some difficult realities, especially 
if they happen to challenge deeply held values and views. Accordingly, they must be recognised as 
such if they are to be properly addressed. 
2. Lack Of Information 
Linked to the denial is the problem of meeting the "prove it" standard set by those who must be 
satisfied that bias is indeed a problem in the justice system beginning with the lawmakers, the 
police, the corrections service, the lawyers and the judiciary. The problem of satisfying those who 
question the existence of any form of bias in the justice system may be even more fundamental if 
this is coupled with the failure to acknowledge the inequality which exists in society for many 
36 David Pannick, Judges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
TI Ibid. at 39. 
38 Ibid. at 40. 
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minority groups. That is because to understand bias in the law and how it operates, one must first 
understand the inequalities in society and how they affect the people who are subject to them. 
Even if there is an appreciation of law's supporting role in existing social structures, a 
prevalent theoretical stumbling block to recognizing gender bias in law is the failure to 
acknowledge women's inequality. Some people still do not believe that women are socially 
disadvantaged ... An understanding of women's inequality is crucial because, simply stated, 
one must see the sexism in society before one can see the gender bias in law.39 
The failure to recognise systemic discrimination is often a function of lack of information. For, 
example, in dealing with issues in which gender is relevant, one might need to understand the 
social dynamics and social inequalities which contribute to the economic condition of many 
women. There are many economic factors to understand such as the feminization of poverty and 
how it relates to mariage breakdowns, spousal and child support issues. There is the social factor 
of fear of assault. There is the fact of differences in control over reproductive processes. If judges 
are to understand how women can face indirect discrimination, of systemic discrimination, they 
require accurate information on the complex social forces at work. 
Once an understanding is gained of inequalities in life, judges must in turn understand how these 
inequalities might, for whatever reason, be continued or even compounded by the law. 
There is a direct link between gender bias in the law an the exclusion of women from 
lawmaking functions. If women did not help make, apply or interpret the law, it should come 
as less of a surprise that many laws do not represent their perspectives or adequately protect 
their interests. Existing legal principles, procedures and norms are essentially exclusionary 
because, being defined largely by men, they largely overlook injustices to women.40 
For example, on its face, the policy of not giving health benefits to part time employees does not 
appear discriminatory. However, jurisprudence in the European Community has determined that 
because most part time workers are female, the denial of employee benefits to part time workers 
is indirect discrimination in certain circumstances. This is because the proportion of women who 
can comply with the requirement that work be full time to qualify for benefits is considerably 
smaller than the proportion of men who can comply with it. This kind of reasoning requires one to 
investigate further than the face of the statute. It is this kind of reasoning which uses a contextual 
approach to equality. 
In a recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, R v. Parks,41 Mr. Justice Doherty identified 
potential racial bias among jurors in concluding that a black man should have the right to 
challenge jurors for cause based on partiality. His comments reflect the concerns which he 
obviously had about the possibility of systemic racism operating to the detriment of this accused: 
There is ... an ever-growing body of studies and reports documenting the extent and intensity 
of racist beliefs in contemporary Canadian society. Many deal with racism in general, others 
with racism directed at black persons ... 
That racism is manifested in three ways. There are those who expressly espouse racist views 
as part of a personal credo. There are others who subconsciously hold negative attitudes 
39 Supra, note 1 8  at 2 1 .  
40 Supra, note 1 8  at 23. 
41 (1 993) 15 O.R. (3d) 324. 
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towards black persons based on stereotypical assumptions concerning persons of colour. 
Finally, and perhaps most pervasively , racism exists within the interstices of our institutions. 
This systemic racism is a product of individual attitudes and beliefs concerning blacks and it 
fosters and legitimizes those assumptions and stereotypes.42 
Of course, lack of information is linked to good faith on the part of the rec1p1ent of the 
information. In other words, increased information will only have a positive benefit if the recipient 
of the information is willing to accept at some fixed point the information given rather than 
moving the yardstick upward in order to meet a yet higher "prove it" standard. The difficulties of 
constantly having to "prove it" have been clearly identified by Dr. Sheilah Martin: 
In a social context of inequality ,  it is most unlikely the "prove it" stage will only be 
encountered once at the beginning of the inquiry. "Proving it" can become a recurrent 
requirement because the case must be made to numerous different constituencies and it may 
need to be repeated until heard, understood, and acted upon ... Members of disadvantaged 
groups realize that part of the price of being reluctantly placed in the position of the chronic 
convincer, is that they are often disparaged as chronic complainers ... The retelling can 
become its own form of discrimination.43 
Once cannot leave this issue without also mentioning how difficult it is for equality seekers to 
marshal! the type of evidence that meets with acceptance from those trained in law. Anecdotal 
evidence from one case is typically rejected as unrepresentative of broader concerns. That 
dismissive response seems particularly inappropriate when one considers that the entire common 
law is itself built on individual cases and an incremental approach to law. 
In addition, from the perspective of attempting to identify institutional practices which might 
unknowingly contribute to systemic bias, there is the problem of the methodology lawyers 
typically use in analyzing cases. That methodology does not assist in revealing existing 
inadequacies. 
A case is analyzed for its logic, reasoning, internal consistency, its conformity with 
precedent , its tone, its result and legal and policy implications. Until recently it was rare for a 
case or body of law to be examined for its sensitivity to the life experience, perspective and 
social understanding of a disadvantaged group ... 
Rarely is a legal method expressly revealed as a methodology and unravelled as a political 
endorsement of certain values and modes of thought. Two basic features of legal craft are the 
ability to abstract real situations into a contest between hierarchically ordered interests and to 
select what is "legally relevant" from the layered complexities of an actual occurrence. This 
often means that the social context in which women live will be factored out , considered to 
be irrelevant or treated as a lower order interest.44 
3. Fear of Compromise Of Judicial Independence 
The fear that judicial awareness training will compromise judicial independence is perhaps the 
most commonly expressed concern that is raise whenever this topic arises. Of course, the principle 
of judicial independence is fundamental to democracy. We all understand the importance of 
judicial independence; without it, the rule of law cannot survive. And of course, each individual 
42 Ibid at 338. 
43 Suptra, note 18 at 29. 
44 Supra, note 18 at 30-31. 
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judge must remain free to exercise his or her best judgment. Judicial independence demands no 
less. The Supreme Court of Canada states this eloquently in R v. Beauregard:45 
Historically, the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial independence has been 
the complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide the cases that come before them: 
no outsider - be it government, pressure group, individual or even another judge - should 
interfere in fact, or attempt to interfere, with the way in which a judge conducts his or her 
cases and makes his or her decision ... 
However, judicial independence exists to protect the public, not just the judiciary. Therefore, 
judicial independence must never be used as a justification for judicial isolation or lack of 
awareness on social issues. Judicial independence exists not so that judges can ignore the world 
around them but so that they can look at it from a vantage point of security and openness. For 
these reasons, I do not view social context education as a threat to judicial independence but 
rather as a way to preserve it. After all, the end result of the judicial education process is to 
educate judges in many different areas of life that they may well not have encountered as part of 
their life experience. How can making decisions from a position of full knowledge impair judicial 
independence? 
It follows that in my view, judicial awareness training is not about indoctrination. It is not about 
receiving submissions from pressure groups about what the result should be in a particular case. 
What it is about is a willingness to consider other ideas, other approaches, other values and other 
beliefs in order to properly discharge one's obligation especially given the existence of the equality 
guarantees under our Constitution. As Madam Justice Rosalie Abella has stated: 
It is fundamental that judges be free from inappropriate or undue influence, independent in 
fact and appearance, and intellectually willing and able to hear evidence and arguments with 
an open mind. But neutrality and impartiality do not and cannot mean that the judge has no 
prior conceptions, opinion or sensibilities about society's values. It means only that these pre­
conceptions ought not to close his or her mind to the evidence and arguments presented.46 
The goal of judicial awareness training is heightened judicial neutrality and a greater ability to 
discharge the judicial role objectively. To invoke judicial independence beyond its proper scope to 
support judicial isolation or non contextual decision making cannot be expected to enhance public 
respect for the judiciary. 
4. Fear of " Special Interest Groups" 
It is interesting that as soon as one begins talking about human rights, sometime the focus quickly 
shifts to special interest groups. The difficulty with this terminology is that it arguably reflects a 
different concern. That is the tendency to identify many systemic concerns about the justice 
system as being the complaints of specific groups of individuals in "special interest" groups. 
Rather than seeing the concerns as indicative of structural flaws in the system, there is a tendency 
to treat them as "women's problem" or a "black problem" or an "aboriginal problem". 
Labelling groups as "special interest" groups (or their views as being "politically correct") is a way 
of marginalizing the concerns of those whose views challenge the status quo. These dismissive 
labels tend to be offered as an excuse for inattention to the groups' concerns. By labelling them as 
45 [ 1 986] 2 S.C.R. 56 at 69 and 73. 
46 Supra, note 28 at 4. 
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"special interest" groups, it signals that there views are not reflective of the wider community 
interests and are merely self preserving pleas to which no serious response is required. One can be 
forgiven for asking who exactly is being labelled as " special interest" groups. The question is 
whether we are entitled to ignore the concerns of substantial portions of the population. We may 
not agree in the end with all the solutions they propose. But there is no reason not the listen to, 
and carefully consider, what they have to say. 
The truth is that the problems with the justice system are the responsibility of everyone intent on 
achieving a fair and equal justice system. Many of these issues cannot be defined by, and are 
certainly not limited by, race and gender. For example, to state the obvious, not all women agree 
on all the same things. And there no doubt are many men who recognize the problems of gender 
bias. Similarly for the concerns of people of colour and the aboriginal peoples. Another flaw with 
this kind of labelling is that it sets up a "we" and "them" analysis and can frequently lead to a siege 
mentality rather than open minded acceptance of new perspectives. 
5. Admitting Imperfections 
Another difficulty with asking members of the judiciary to engage in judicial awareness training is 
that to agree that this has merit is sometimes seen as conceding that the system is not now 
objective in all respects. This strikes at the heart of the justice system and the judiciary's role in it. 
After all, if there exists a need for education on social context issues, including the extent to which 
systemic discrimination might unwittingly be operating, it follows that there exists a significant 
discord between reality and the core values of the legal and judicial system based as they are on 
principles of fairness, impartiality and objectivity. 
6. It Makes Court Too Political 
It is sometimes suggested that being educated on social context issues will make the courts too 
political in their outlook. But as Madam Justice Rosalie Abella of the Ontario Court of Appeal has 
said: 
It is important to understand that there is nothing new about politicization for the courts . . .  
We now call them activist, politicized courts because they are active i n  their interventions on 
behalf of the expansion of rights in the political process. But to show elasticity of the labels, 
we should remember that we used to call court activist when they were active in their 
interventions on behalf of the prevention of the expansion of rights . . .  If expanding rights is 
political, so is restricting them.47 
Further, subsumed within in this concern is the view that learning about values and social realities 
is a purely political exercise. This concern ignores the fact that values and social realities change 
over time and judges should not be afraid to acknowledge this. 
In 1776, when the American Declaration of Independence pronounced that al men were created equal, 
many of the framers of the Constitution had slaves, and women could not vote. In 1633 ,  Galileo was 
forced to apologize publicly for spreading the news of the evidence revealed by his telescope . . .  And, in 
1938, the then editor of Saturday Night magazine, said "The business of women is to keep house and to 
keep quiet. "  Truths change over time, and judges should not be hesitant to acknowledge these changes.48 
47 Supra, note 28, at 7-8.  
48 Supra, note 28 at 4. 
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7. Expecting Unanimity from Minority Groups 
Sometimes, the view is advanced that since not al women or blacks or aboriginals agree on 
the existence of bias or the forms in which it presents itself, that means that the concerns of those 
who advocate a different vision or different values ought not to be heard. Unanimity of viewpoint 
amongst the affected group is lacking. But this type of approach ignores the obvious. 
Discrimination does not have to be everywhere and apparent to everyone to exist. It is enough 
that a significant number view it as a structural problem. In no other area of democracy do we 
demand 100% unanimity by any group as a condition precedent to addressing a problem. Nor 
should we when it comes to human rights. 
8. Reluctance to Examine Personal Values 
Another difficulty encountered in structuring judicial awareness training is the fact that since much 
of it focuses on values, beliefs, assumptions, myths, stereotypes and relationships, it can be 
intensely personal. Certainly, the issue of gender is something on which everyone has a view. 
Gender programs often require people to scrutinize their closest personal relationships. This is a 
challenge to us all, especially since it can lead to fear of loss of control. 
9. Institutional Pressures 
Judges hold a unique position. At all levels, there is a well developed sense of collegiality and an 
operative culture that expects things to happen along prescribed lines. Not all of those lines 
promote a willingness to change. That is why it is important that judicial leaders encourage this 
kind of education and provide the necessary leadership and atmosphere to cultivate development 
of appropriate programming. 
V. CONSIDERATIONS IN STRUCTURING A JUDICIAL EDUCATION MODEL 
A model of judicial education should be designed to suit local needs. That said, in Canada, we 
have found that certain key ingredients are essential to the success of the programming. 
The scope of this type of training must be addressed from the outset. A fundamental question is 
whether the approach should be minimalist or comprehensive. In Canada, our goal has been to 
develop and deliver comprehensive, credible and in depth judicial education on social context 
issues. That goal has been endorsed by the Canadian Judicial Council. Credible means credible 
from the perspective of both the judges and the community. A successful model for judicial 
education on social context issues includes these principles: (1) a process orientated approach; (2) 
judicial leadership; (3) judicial faculty; ( 4) skills training for judicial faculty; and (5) public 
involvement in the education process by academics and community representatives. In my view, 
the ultimate goal of judicial awareness training on social context issues ought to be to fully 
integrate this training into substantive law topics. I propose to deal with each of the above 
principles in turn. 
1. Process-Oriented Model 
First, this type of training must include more than conferencing. It is also vitally important that the 
necessary groundwork be laid across the country so that each jurisdiction is directly involved in 
and committed to this type of training. This way, when a conference ends, the training continues. 
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There should be no end to the process. It is something which must be on going and which must 
constantly be renewing itself. 
It is important to recognise that effective judicial education on issues such as gender and 
racial equality is not comparable to receiving an inoculation - it cannot be accomplished as a 
"one shot" event. In order to achieve an intellectual understanding of the issues and, equally 
important, personal recognition of them at a more emotional level, there must be sustained 
and long-term effort... 
Thus, judicial education programs will be most effective where they form part of an ongoing 
process involving a number of judicial leaders, rather than isolated efforts.49 
2. Judicial Leadership 
The second principles is judicial leadership. Without a commitment by the judicial leaders of the 
country, the likelihood of successfully implementing judicial awareness training is minimal. In fact, 
the education efforts could be a waste of time or worse yet, counterproductive. Strong and 
committed judicial leadership validates the education process and opens the door to this kind of 
learning. This is something that the American experience has aptly demonstrated. 
3. Peer Leadership in Training 
Using judges to teach other judges is very effective. That is one reason why one should draw upon 
local judicial resources. But there is another. Local peer leaders of the judiciary can also provide 
leadership in this area for their colleagues. This means identifying potential peer leaders amongst 
the judiciary in each province to act as judicial lecturers. But judges should not resile from the 
opportunity to receive education from experts including academics in various fields. We must 
make use of the best people available. 
4. Teaching Excellence 
Peer judicial lecturers must be offered the opportunity to participate in skills training to allow then 
to learn adult education techniques as well as to educate them on equality issues and how they 
affect substantive law. 
5. Community Involvement 
Community involvement in judicial education is essential to the success of social context 
education. Community perspectives add a real life perspective to the inquiry as well as giving the 
community insight into the judiciary's commitment on these issues. 
Credibility in the community will depend upon the extent to which the community as a 
whole, and particular communities, are kept informed about the programming that is taking 
place. Bringing in the native elders, workers in battered women's shelters, persons with 
disabilities, survivors of sexual assault, and others with relevant first-hand experience can 
provide unique opportunity for judges to learn about some issues in a direct way, ask 
questions which would not be appropriate in a courtroom. Similarly, programming that takes 
judges out to see people in their own setting can be very useful. At the same time, these 
representatives of communities will see that judges as interested in thinking about the issues 
that effect them.50 
49 Lynn Smith, Q. C. ,  Dean of Law, University of British Colombia. 
50 Ibid. 
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The view of one Canadian judicial education leader, who is both judge and educator, with 
extensive experience in the delivery of these programs are worth noting. He has observed that 
numerous studies on the failures of the justice system have recommended that we create a stable 
professional approach to address community concerns about the delivery of justice. It is hoped 
that this training will produce concrete change. The need is often expressed for jurists to better 
understand the real life circumstances of litigants, and to respond appropriately. The call in 
numerous studies is for a process that will allow the exchange of information and ideas. 
An integral part of such training is that it must respect and honour the integrity of the judicial 
office. It must recognize that a judicial appointment is strong evidence that the person has a sound 
personal and professional reputation, high intellect, and has leadership qualities. Social context 
education has to support and enhance the judicial office. In order to be useful, it must 
intellectually challenge the fine minds who will apply it in their everyday task of determining the 
law. It is essential that it intellectually challenge in a non adversarial, respectful and cooperative 
manner. This same educator has also suggested that the process will not be successful, however, 
unless the trainers and the community representatives are also treated with respect. 5 1 
You may wonder why I advocate the inclusion of community input into our training, given the 
fundamental principle of judicial independence. Again, in my view, the justice system cannot really 
succeed in responding to the needs of the public unless it is inclusive. To be inclusive, it must be 
informed by the realities of our citizens. This is essential to justice being fair and equal. It means 
that we do not necessarily adopt a particular view presented to us , but we at least understand and 
deal with the different experiences of our citizens in the decision making process .  The educational 
process must include people who can offer insight into different perspectives so that it is not 
insular and exclusive of other views. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If the judiciary is to maintain its integral role as part of a justice system that the public expects wil 
deliver justice, then we must ensure that we ourselves meet justice's highest standard. That means 
an informed, open-minded judiciary, respectful of change when warranted, and oblivious to 
change when capricious. We have to learn to know the difference and what social realities to take 
seriously and when. There are obvious restrictions on how freely judges can move and participate 
in non judicial world. This sometimes curtails our ability to understand some of the most crucial 
social evolution and yet unless we understand them, we are remiss in our duties. This is why 
meaningful and quality judicial education is such a critical part of the judicial role . Without 
informed education about the realities of the world in which judges live, it is difficult to see how 
we can be expected to judge it fairly. 
We are at a crossroad in time. Everyone has a choice to make. The choice is between continuing 
to follow the road we have been travelling or making a sharp tum towards a better future in the 
way we respond to calls for judicial awareness training. At this crossroad, while many have made 
their choice and have turned, some still linger at the junction in the past in their attitudes .  We need 
to show them the way to the future and help them to move quickly. 
51 Judge Douglas R. Campbell of the Western Judicial Education Centre. 
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W OMEN IN PAKISTAN 
LEGALISING THE PROSECUTION OF VICTIMS 
Dahlia Eissa is the winner of the Women and the Law Student Paper Competition for 1996 and was 
the President of WATL in 1995. Ms Eissa examines criminal law in Pakistan which deals with 
sexual offences and contends that the law as implemented deviates from true Islamic principles with 
respect to the rights of women. 
In the fifth year after the Hegira in the Muslim calendar, the Prophet Muhammed and His followers 
were returning from an expedition to the Banu Mustaliq. When the march was ordered, Aisha, the 
Prophet' s  wife, was not in her tent as she had gone to search for a necklace that she had dropped. 
Aisha' s  litter was however veiled and it was not known when the camp left the area that she was not 
inside. When Aisha returned to the camp site, having found that they had left without her, she sat 
down to rest and wait for someone to come back for her when her absence was noticed. The next 
day a young soldier, Safwan, found Aisha and carried her on his camel back to Medina, as he led 
the camel on foot. The return of Aisha with the young man created a scandal in the city which 
became known as the "affair of the slander" and made its way into the Quran. 1 In response to the 
scandal, the following revelations appear in the Quran: 
Why did not the Believers 
Men and women when ye 
Heard of the affair, put 
The best construction on it 
In their own minds 
And say, "This (charge) 
Is an obvious lie"?2 
Why did they not bring 
Four witnesses to prove it? 
When they have not brought 
The witnesses, such men, in the sight of God, 
(Stand forth) themselves as liars ! 3 
The revelations in the Quran continue with explicit and harsh reprobations of those who slander 
women and reflect aspects of Islam that have been buried by cultural constructs internalised in the 
Muslim world that embody notions of gender role differentiation and identify women as sexually 
dangerous. One could easily be led to believe by reading the works of many Muslim scholars or 
noting the laws regulating sexual conduct, or even the cultural constraints that women are subjected 
to in Muslim countries, that Islam is a religion that focuses on the repression of sexuality and 
women are sexuality in its basic form. Islam is primarily concerned with the individual ' s  relationship 
with his or her creator, demonstrated by the individual ' s  faith, piety and righteousness. What is 
relevant to an individual ' s  piety is his or her adherence to the Islamic concept of morality. For this 
reason, Islam is a religion that provides for rules that affect the personal lives of its followers, and 
the regulation of sexual conduct is one aspect of this. However, these rules apply to men and 
women equally and are in no way congruent with the oppressive laws that are enforced in most 
1 Ali, A. Yusuf 1983.  The Holy Quran. Translation and Commentary. Maryland: Amana Corp. 
2 The Holy Quran Verse 12, Chapter XXIV. 
3 The Holy Quran Verse 1 3 ,  Chapter XXIV. 
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Muslim countries that have been implemented for the sole purpose of maintaining men' s  control over 
women' s  sexuality. 
Islamic law, according to Muslims, is expressly devised by God, or Allah. The two primary sources 
of law are the Shari' a, containing the express laws of God,4 and the Sunnah, containing the 
pronouncements and practices of the Prophet Muhammed.5 The two secondary sources of law, 
ijma and qiyas, 6 are processes of interpretation to formulate laws accommodating the changing 
needs of society. Islamic law has been adopted to varying degrees in different Muslim countries.7 
However, the law as implemented in these countries deviates greatly from true Islamic principles 
with respect to the rights of women. "Equality is the most prevalent theme in the [Koran] ,"8 yet 
throughout the history of Islamic jurisprudence the spirit of Islam and the express laws laid down in 
the Quran have been ignored in favour cultural beliefs that perpetuate women' s  inferior status in 
intellectual and spiritual terms. This practice has been facilitated by the absence of revision in Islamic 
jurisprudence. In Islam, legal interpretation in light of contemporary circumstances was conducted 
until the tenth century when it was repudiated by the clergy. Religious scholars have since been of 
the belief that Islamic law is static and that social, economic and political conditions must adapt 
themselves to Islamic law, despite the fact that Islam requires and encourages interpretation in light 
of contemporary circumstances, and the use of independent judgement is praised.9 
4 In Islam, God is the legislator and the Shari 'a is considered immutable and cannot be subject to revision or 
invalidation by a court or legislative body. Human legislation is only recognised where there are no express 
pronouncements in the Quran and such legislation is congruent with the spirit of Islam or necessary for carrying the 
Divine Law into effect. 
David J. Karl 1 99 1 .  "Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorneys Should Know" in George Washington 
Journal of International Law and Economics. 25: 1 1 3 - 1 70. p. 1 33. 
5 It is believed that Allah chose the Prophet Muhammed to convey the Divine Revelations to the world. The Prophet 
began in Mecca in 6 1 0  AD to establish a social order based on those Revelations to correct the spiritual and social ills 
prevalent there. These ills were attributed to polytheism and idol worship, exploitation of the poor, ill-treatment of 
women and unfair trade practices. 
SA Modern Legal Systems Cyclopaedia 1 984. (Kenneth R. Redden, ed.) 100.5.  
6Ijma represents the consensus among Muslim scholars on specific legal issues and qiyas is a process of analogical or 
syllogistic reasoning. 
David S. Powers 1992. "On Judicial Review in Islamic Law" in Law and Society Review. 26(2): 3 1 5-34 1.  p3 1 8. 
7Most Muslim countries have adopted a predominantly secular legal system, limiting the application of Islamic law to 
family and criminal matters. 
8 Nayer Honarvar 1988. "Behind the Veil: Women 's Rights in Islamic Societies" in Journal of Family Law. 6: 355. 
p.361.  
It  was Islam that outlawed the practice of female infanticide, gave women the right to own property, entitlements to 
inheritance and the right to be educated; rights women in the West would not acquire until the nineteenth century . 
9 Abdul Ghafus 1 989. "Islamization of Laws in Pakistan" in Studies in Islamic Law, Religion and Society. (H. S .  
Bhatia ed.) New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications. 145- 1 55. pp. 146- 147. 
From then on jurists were only permitted to expound on existing law which comprised not only of that taken directly 
from the Quran, but also those laws interpreted in light of seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth century circumstances and 
adopting the cultural constructs of those times. The mass of interpretation that did take place in the first few centuries 
of Islam was in the hands of deeply conservative male scholars, whose decisions have remained largely unchanged. 
These scholars strongly adhered to notions of role differentiation between men and women based on their apparent 
psychological and physiological differences - notions that characterise all societies today - and formed the basis upon 
which Islamic jurisprudents justified legal interpretations that discriminated against women. Hence, one of the most 
prominent contemporary interpreters of the Islamic position on women accounts for the ideology that discriminates 
against women by pointing to, 
physiological differences between men and women such as the size of the heart, the weight of the 
brain, and the size of the skull. The psychological differences ... are that women are affectionate and 
emotional and have weaker nerves. Men, however, are wise and intellectual and have strong nerves, 
which make them more qualified to strive, struggle and campaign against the odds of everyday life. 
Allamah Nuri, quoted in Shireen Mahdari 1 985. "The Position of Women in Shi 'a Iran: Views of the Ulama" in 
Women and the Family in the Middle East: New Voices of Change. (F. Azari, ed.). 
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The persistence of misinterpretation in Islamic jurisprudence also has its roots in the structure of the 
Muslim community. Muslims place importance on their participation in an idealised larger religious 
community, known as the umma. Throughout history the stability of the umma has been under 
threat, either as a result of sectarian strife or as a result of cultural incursions by the west. Such 
threats are believed to result in fitna, or social chaos. To avoid fitna and maintain the unity of the 
umma, disagreements in Islamic jurisprudence are avoided. Even the most progressive jurists are 
careful not to challenge entrenched legal norms if to do so would pose a threat to the unity of the 
umma. 1 0  Thus, in the Muslim world, extremists reject law reform as "heretical innovations inspired 
by Western examples that would lead to decadence, immorality and the destruction of the family."1 1  
Gender role differentiation in the umma i s  considered part of the natural order and in order to 
maintain the patriarchal nature of the umma, women are treated as a source of fitna. Women are 
considered to have a natural tendency to flaunt their beauty, thus tempting God fearing men, and 
threatening the stability of the family. For this reason, women are treated as suspect and 
untrustworthy, and so their sexuality must be kept in check for fear that they may plunge the umma 
into fitna. This belief has played an intrinsic role in Islamic jurisprudence resulting in the 
propagation of many laws throughout the Muslim world that seek to curtail women' s  freedom of 
movement and treat women as sexual vagrants. The literal translation of the Arabic word fitna is 
"temptation" or "trial". In at least one modem dialect it can also refer to an attractive woman. 12 
Extra marital sexual relations are prohibited and punishable in Islam. 13  The gender of the offender is 
irelevant to the seriousness of the offence, the evidentiary requirements for establishing the offence 
and awarding punishment. In order to establish the offence, known as zina, the testimony of four 
witnesses to the act of intercourse itself is required, making it a somewhat difficult offence to 
establish. The gender of the witnesses is irrelevant. Also forbidden in Islam is falsely accusing a man 
or a woman of having committed zina. In the absence of the testimony of four witnesses, anyone 
making such an accusation is considered a falsifier whose evidence on any matter cannot be accepted 
thereafter in an Islamic court of law. The accuser must also be severely punished. 14 While such laws 
may appear in a western context to be draconian in nature and a violation of individuals'  privacy, the 
purpose of such laws in Islam is the protection of the institution of the family as traditionally 
prescribed. Gender is completely irrelevant to this area of law. However in Muslim countries this 
area of law is misinterpreted as gender specific. Laws relating to zina in Muslim countries are 
products of cultural constructs that relate moral indecency to the freedom of women and assign men 
as the guardians of family honour. One such law is the Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance 
1 9791 5  of Pakistan. 
There is great tension between conservative and progressive forces in Pakistan and " [t]he women' s  
rights issue has been played as  the "trump card" in political struggles for power". 16  A perceived lack 
of adherence to traditional interpretations of Islamic law was used effectively by opposition forces to 
10 Leites, Justin 199 1 .  "Modernist Jurisprudence as a Vehicle for Gender Role Reform in the Islamic World" in 
Columbia Human Rights Law Review. 22:25 1 -330. pp.26 1 -262, 294. 
1 1  Mayer, Ann Elizabeth 1 987. "Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East" in The American Journal of 
Comparative Law. 35: 126- 1 84. p. 1 27. 
1 2 Mernissi, Fatima 1987. Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamic in Modern Muslim Society. Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press. p.3 1  
1 3 Verses 2 and 3 of Chapter XXIV provide that adultery and fornication are punishable offences in Islam. 
14 Verse 4 of Chapter XXIV states that falsifiers are to be punished and their evidence rejected for ever after, unless 
they repent according to Verse 5 of Chapter XXIV. 
1 5 Ordinance VII of 1 979. 
1 6 Venkatraman, Bharathi Anandhi 1995. "Islamic States and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the Shari 'a and the Convention Compatible?" in The American 
University Law Review. 44: 1949-2027. p. 1 99 1. 
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destabilise the Ali Bhutto government and later the Benazir Bhutto government. Both governments 
have been characterised as secular, un Islamic, and sympathetic towards western culture. 1 7  In 
Pakistan Islam is used as a form of identity and a distinguishing feature separating it from the 
imperialist west. The most important feature of this identity is the honour of the family which rests 
in the perceived decency of its women. Thus,  when women appear to be less under the control of 
their menfolk and participate more in activities outside the home, traditionalists are quick to exploit 
men ' s  sensibilities by branding such trends a threat to their honour and ultimately to society. 
After the overthrow of the Ali Bhutto government in 1977 the military regime of General Zia ul Haq 
was responsible for the passing of many repressive laws and ordinances under the guise of an 
"Islamisation process". 1 8  Part II of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 which 
deals with fundamental rights and principles of policy was suspended under the country' s  emergency 
powers. 1 9  The suspension of that Part marked the beginning of an era in Pakistan which would see 
women be subjected to abhorrent human rights violations. In 1979 the regime enacted four Hudood 
Ordinances which deal with criminal law. The stated purpose was to bring the criminal laws of 
Pakistan in line with Islamic law, although both in substance and in form the laws are un Islarnic.20 
The Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance deals specifically with sexual offences. It 
criminalises sexual relations outside of mariage. The preamble of the Ordinance states that its 
purpose is "to modify the existing law relating to zina so as to bring it in conformity with the 
Injunctions of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah."21 However, the Ordinance facilitates 
horrific violations of human rights and is an invidious affront to the plain meaning and spirit of Islam, 
and is a flagrant flouting of principles of natural justice that are espoused in Islamic law. Despite 
this, no measures have been taken to repeal or review the Ordinance, even by the presently 
democratically elected government of Benazir Bhutto. 
Section 4 of the Ordinance states that "A man and a woman are said to commit zina if they wilfuly 
have sexual intercourse without being validly married to each other." Section 6 defines the offence 
of zina bil jabr or rape.22 Zina bil jabr can be committed by a man or a woman against a person 
17 ibid. , p. 1 992. 
1 8 Jalal, Ayesha 199 1 .  "The Convenience of Subservience: Women and the State of Pakistan" in Women, Islam 
and the State . (Deniz Kandiyoti, ed.) London: Macmillan. p. 101.  
19  Article 25 of that Part provides that 
(1) All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law. 
(2) There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone. 
(3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for 
the protection of women and children. 
Part II remained suspended until December 30 1 985 with the lifting of Martial Law. 
20 Patel, Rashida 199 1 .  Socio-Economic and Political Status of Women and Law in Pakistan. Karachi: Faiza 
Publishers. p.22. 
2 1  Ordinance VII of 1 979. 
22 Section 6: A person is said to commit zina-bil-jabr if he or she has sexual intercourse with a woman or a man, as 
the case may be, to whom he or she is not validly married in any of the following circumstances, namely:-
(a) against the will of the victim; 
(b) without the consent of the victim; 
(c) with the consent of the victim when the consent has been obtained by putting the victim in fear of death or 
of hurt, or 
(d) with the consent of the victim, when the offender knows that the offender is not validly married to the 
victim and that the consent is given because the victim believes that the offender is another person to whom the 
victim is or believes herself or himself to be validly married 
Explanation:- Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of zina-bil-jabr. 
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they are not married to. The Ordinance does not criminalise rape in marriage. Section 8 lays down 
the requirements for proving zina or zina bil-jabr: 
Proof of zina or zina bil-jabr . . .  shall be in one of the following forms, namely:
(a) the accused makes before a Court of competent jurisdiction a confession of the 
commission of the offence; or 
(b) at least four Muslim adult male witnesses, about whom the Court is satisfied . . .  that 
they are truthful persons and abstain from major sins, give evidence as eye witnesses of 
the act of penetration necessary to the offence. 
Provided that, if the accused is a non Muslim, the eye witnesses may be non Muslims. 
A person found guilty of zina under this provision will be liable to hadd punishment, which is 
defined in s .2(b) as punishment ordained by the Holy Quran or Sunnah. Hadd punishment for zina 
and zina bil jabr has been interpreted by Islamic scholars in Pakistan as stoning to death or the 
infliction of 100 stripes in a public place. 
If the requirements of s. 8 cannot be met, that is, four male Muslim witnesses cannot be produced, 
but there is convincing evidence that a person has committed zina or zina bil jabr, that person wil 
not be liable to hadd, but may be liable to the lesser punishment of tazir.23 Section 10(2) provides 
that the tazir punishment for zina is a term of imprisonment of a minimum of four years and a 
maximum of 10  years, thirty stripes and a fine. For zina bil jabr s. 10(3) provides that the tazir 
punishment is a term of imprisonment of a maximum of 25 years and thirty stripes. 
The evidentiary requirements under the Ordinance are clearly inconsistent with the express 
provisions in the Quran. While the requirement of four witnesses for zina is correct, there is no 
requirement in Islam that the witnesses be male or Muslim. With respect to rape, the Shari' a does 
not require the testimony of four Muslim male witnesses to establish the commission of the offence. 
The matter is dealt with in the Sunnah which deals with specific instances of offenders being 
convicted and punished by the sole testimony of the complainant. Further, Islamic law permits the 
use of circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of a crime in the absence of witnesses and 
the Zina Ordinance precludes this.24 
The Quran does not prescribe death or stoning to death as punishment for zina.25 There are cases in 
the Sunnah where adulterers were stoned to death for zina and this has been assumed to be the 
practice of the Prophet Muhammed. However, these instances involved the application of tribal 
laws and occurred prior to the Quranic revelations.26 Irrespective of this, the provisions in the 
Shari' a are clear and override any inconsistency to be found in the Sunnah. The Sunnah is resorted 
to to interpret ambiguities in the Shari' a or fil in any gaps in the law. There is no ambiguity with 
respect to the punishment for zina. Thus, the application of the death penalty for zina in Pakistan 
involves giving precedence to the Sunnah and to punishments clearly repealed by later revelations. 
2 3  Section 10.  
2 4  Verses 26-28 of Chapter XII relate to an incidence in which circumstantial evidence was permissible to establish a 
defence and there are many instances in the Sunnah were such evidence was accepted to establish the commission of 
an offence. 
Ali, Mauleana Muhammad The Religion of Islam. UAR: National Publication and Printing House. p.758. The year 
of publication is not provided. 
25 Verses 2 and 3 of Chapter XXIV deal with the punishment for zina. 
26 Ali, op cit . ,  p.755. 
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The tazir punishment provided for in the Ordinance is also contrary to Islamic principles of law and 
has been challenged as such in Begum Rashida Patel and Others v Federal Government of 
Pakistan.21 The challengers petitioned the Federal Shariat Court to strike down the provisions 
relating to tazir punishment in the Ordinance as inconsistent with the express provisions of the Quran 
relating to the number of witnesses required to establish the offence of zina. Tazir punishment can 
be imposed in the absence of the testimony of four witnesses, especially where a woman has become 
pregnant which establishes an act of intercourse. The petitioners contended that in the absence of 
four witnesses, an accusation of zina cannot be used for the purposes of imposing tazir punishment. 
The Federal Shariat Court considered this petition, but despite finding that tazir punishment cannot 
be imposed in the absence of four witnesses, according to the Quranic requirement, the Court 
refused to strike down s.10(2) and s.10(3) of the Ordinance. The petitioners have appealed against 
the decision to the Supreme Court Shariat Bench.28 
What is most reprehensible about the Ordinance is its treatment of victims of rape. It effectively 
blurs the distinction between rape and adultery29 and, failing a confession by a rapist, the maximum 
punishment cannot be imposed without the testimony of four Muslim male witnesses of good repute. 
Ayesha Jalal notes that the Ordinance does not explain how four Muslim men of good repute could 
allow a rape to take place in the first place. 30 The evidence of the victim herself is irrelevant, as is 
expert opinion or medical evidence. Thus a man can rape a woman in the presence of 100 other 
women and not be subjected to hadd punishment under the Ordinance. The testimony of women and 
non Muslims (unless the accused is a non Muslim) is only relevant with respect to the lesser tazir 
punishment. 
The discriminatory evidentiary requirements under the Ordinance have also created a climate of fear 
for rape victims, resulting in extremely few complaints of rape being made. If a woman brings a 
complaint of rape, that complaint is evidence on the record that zina has taken place, and the issue 
becomes whether it occurred with or without the consent of the complainant. It must be established 
via the testimony of four male Muslim witnesses of good repute that she was not a willing party to 
zina and that zina bil jabr was committed. If such testimony is not forthcoming, she may be 
charged under the Ordinance with having committed zina as her admission of sexual intercourse 
having occurred yet unproven complaint of rape is sufficient to impose tazir punishment. It is thus 
not uncommon in Pakistan to see rape victims subjected to tazir, imprisoned and flogged. If a rape 
victim becomes pregnant, that is also evidence of an act of intercourse and unless it is established 
that it occurred without the woman' s  consent, again, tazir punishment may be imposed. The 
evidentiary requirements have essentially created a presumption of guilt on the part of complainants 
of rape. They are guilty of zina until they can prove that they have been victims of zina bil-jabr. It 
is estimated that in the Karachi Central Court alone approximately 15 per cent of rape trials result in 
the complainant being charged and convicted of zina.3 1 
One of the most notorious cases occurred in 1985 when Safia Bibi, a blind girl, was convicted of 
zina. 32 Her father had brought a criminal complaint against a landlord and his son for having raped 
Safi.a. Safia had become pregnant and given birth to a child33 which was evidence of an act of 
intercourse but it was not established by the testimony of four Muslim male witnesses that the act of 
27 PLD 1 989 Federal Shariat Court (Pak). 
28 Patel, op cit. , pp.30-3 1.  
2 9  Jalal, op cit . ,  p. 1 02. 
30 ibid. 
31 Amnesty International 1 995. Women In Pakistan, Disadvantaged and Denied Their Rights. AS A 33(23/95. p.6.  
3 2  Safia Bibi v State PLD 1 985 120 Federal Shariat Court (Pak). 
33 The child died soon after being born. 
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intercourse was without her consent. Because of this, Safia was charged with having committed 
zina. She was convicted and sentenced to 1 5  lashes, three years rigorous imprisonment, and she 
was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1 000. Because there were no witnesses to testify against the men 
accused of rape, the case against them was dismissed for lack of evidence. The conviction brought 
forth a barage of criticism from the media and the public which instigated the Federal Shariat 
Court ' s  request for the records of the case. The Court reviewed the case and reversed the finding of 
the trial court, quashing her conviction. 
The Chief Justice of the Federal Shariat Court, Aftab Hussain, held that the trial judge took Safia 
Bibi ' s  pregnancy as culpability and "entered the realm of conjecture" convicting her simply on the 
basis that zin bil jabr was not established.34 His Honour held that if a woman makes a complaint of 
rape as made in that case, she cannot be convicted of zina, irrespective of whether a charge of rape 
is established. 35 Despite this, His Honour held that the bare statement of the complainant was not 
sufficient to convict the accused and the case against the landlord and his son was rightly dismissed 
in the circumstances for lack of evidence. 36 While the judgement appears to have been progressive in 
nature as it laid down the principle that a charge of zina cannot emanate from a complaint of rape, 
that principle has not been followed in later cases brought before the courts.37 What has been 
followed is the principle that the sole testimony of a victim of rape is effectively a bar to establishing 
the guilt of an accused. 
The object of a criminal justice system is to deter the commission of offences and to punish offenders 
to prevent recidivism. The Zina Ordinance however has proven to be largely ineffectual in 
preventing sexual offences being committed against women. In July 1989 the Ministry of Women' s  
Development appointed the Pakistan Women' s  Rights Committee to report to the Ministry on legal 
reforms necessary to improve the status of women in Pakistan. The Committee reported that, 
the Zina Ordinance has lowered the regard and the respect for women in the country. 
The Ordinance is among the reasons for the rising incidence of crimes against women 
which has been accentuated by the anti attitude towards women, recently evident by the 
rising tide of crimes against women, especially rape and custodial rape.38  
The Vice President of the Pakistan Human Rights Commission has condemned the Ordinance as 
strengthening "the hands of men to persecute and punish women without regard for justice."39 
Women have been forced to succumb to men 's  wishes to prevent false accusations of zina being 
made against them. The Ordinance has practically become a blackmail tool for fathers, husbands, 
brothers and even strangers to force women to stay in their homes, to leave their homes, to give up 
their children, to hand over their incomes and assets, or to marry someone against their will. 40 
Another area of concern is the application of the Ordinance to children. Section 2(a) defines an 
"adult" as "a person who has attained, being a male, the age of eighteen years or, being a female, 
the age of sixteen years, or has attained puberty." It is not uncommon for girls to reach puberty at 
the age of 10  or 1 1 . Under the Ordinance they can be charged with zina and if convicted, can be 
subjected to hadd punishment of stoning to death or 100 lashes, or of tazir punishment of lashings 
34 Safia Bibi v State, op cit., pp. 122- 123. 
35 ibid. , p. 124. 
36 ibid. , p. 122. 
37 Amnesty International op cit. , p.6. 
38 quoted in Patel , op cit. , p.28. 
39 Sabihuddin Ahmed quoted in H. S. Bhatia, ed. op cit. , p. 1 95.  
40 Patel , op cit. , p.27. 
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and imprisonment. Pakistan is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
1 985. Article 37(a) of the Convention provides that, 
No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment 
or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of 
release shall be imposed for offences connnitted by persons below eighteen years of age. 
Pakistan ratified the Convention in 1990 with the reservation that its provisions were to be 
interpreted in light of Islamic values and laws. The Committee on the Rights of the Child which 
oversees the observance to the Convention noted that "practically no provision of the Convention 
comes in direct conflict with any of the major precepts of Islam."41 Despite this, Pakistan has failed 
to reform those laws, including the Zina Ordinance, that permit children to be subjected to cruel 
d .  h . h 42 an m umane pums ment. 
The substantive and procedural provisions of the Zina Ordinance are inconsistent with the express 
provisions in the Quran relating to the offence of zina and the evidentiary requirements involved in 
proving such an offence, and reflect the centuries old notion that women ' s  sexuality is a threat to the 
social order and must be contained as such. The cultures of all Muslim countries have shaped laws 
that oppress women and Pakistan is only one of many countries requiring a complete revision of the 
application and interpretation of Islamic law. While it may be argued that there exist different and 
conflicting interpretations of many verses in the Quran, what cannot be disputed is the plain meaning 
of the express provisions relating to zina and the evidentiary requirements in Islamic criminal law. 
The meaning is clear and unambiguous. It is simply and blatantly disregarded. The same 
presumption of innocence until proven guilty that we steadfastly adhere to in our own legal system 
has the same status in Islamic law. With respect to sexual offences, a woman who has made a 
complaint of rape can never be prosecuted for zina, nor is the testimony of four Muslim men 
required to establish the commission of rape. The complainant' s  testimony and circumstantial 
evidence are admissible. At the time of the Prophet Muhammed, those who slandered women were 
censured and reproached, and justice was effectively administered when a woman' s  physical 
integrity was violated. Today in Pakistan, slandering women has become an effective tool to ensure 
their subservience and helplessness, and when a woman' s  physical integrity is violated, so is her 
intellectual integrity, for the criminal justice system requires the testimony of four men to prove that 
she is not a liar. In order to improve its human rights status in the international community, the 
present government of Benazir Bhutto has pledged to respect human rights and reform laws that 
discriminate against women. It must be remembered that such goals are not only indicative of an 
adherence to human rights nors, but also an adherence to genuine Islamic principles. 
4 1  Amnesty International op cit. , p. 1 3 .  
42 ibid. 
30 
W OMEN IN PARLIAMENT: 
W HAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE? 
Di Zetlin is a lecturer in Political Science in the Department of Government, University of 
Queensland, specialising in women's studies, political theory, higher education policy and 
industrial relations . Sharon Broughton is a PhD student and Research Assistant also in the 
Department of Government. In this paper they raise questions regarding the experiences of women 
parliamentarians and their contributions to the political system and policy making. A/thought there 
is still uncertainty about the "diference" women MPs make, with more women joining the 
parliamentary ranks at State and Federal levels, there is greater opportunity to research the 
emerging patterns and perceptions. 
What difference does it make if there are more or less women politicians? The short answer is, we 
don't really know. To date we know very little about the kind of contribution, or difnce, 
Australian women parliamentarians make to politics. We do not know enough about whether women 
experience parliament differently from men; if their parliamentary careers are different from those of 
men; or whether their style of work may contribute uniquely to parliamentary agendas, priorities and 
operational mode. We have largely ignored women's potential impact upon the policy framework of 
our parliaments and on the way political business is conducted. Al this despite the possibility that 
understanding women's representation may be crucial to understanding how our political system 
operates in the future. 
The long answer is that as more women enter the hallowed corridors of political power, and as more 
research is conducted into women in politics, a profile of women's personal and political 
backgrounds, their attitudes to issues and their perceptions of their role as representatives is 
emerging. For example, we know that women politicians today differ from their female counterparts 
in the past, but resemble their contemporary male colleagues. They are now more likely to be 
younger, highly educated, from professional backgrounds, and politically ambitious. Not so long ago, 
the argument was that women were not well enough educated or interested enough or talented 
enough to join the parliamentary ranks. 
What we do not know are the answers to more complex questions such as: How do women 
politicians see themselves and their role? Are these perceptions different from their male colleagues? 
And if so, does their difference make a difference? Do they want to make a difference as women for 
women? How important is the difference between men and women compared with differences 
between parties? 
There is still an uncertainty about the newly emerging public role of women. Some expect that 
women will transfer some of their privately acquired skills of nurturance and consensus making into 
the public arena. Feminist expectations are that women will represent a set of women's issues that 
have previously not been part of the public agenda. In addition, women are not only expected to 
change policies but to transform the very manner in which political decisions are made, to "civilise" 
the parliament. 
3 1  
The "diff ere nee dilemma " 
The situation is further complicated by the so called "difference dilemma" .  Women are caught 
between proving that they are just as able as men at the same time as proving that they will make a 
difference because they are not men. 
How do women parliamentarians cope with these expectations, and conduct their normal 
parliamentary and constituency work and juggle their work and family commitments? Do they make 
a difference? Two arenas, public policy and parliamentary procedure, are particularly useful in 
looking at whether women in politics make a difference. Recent research into the impact of women 
in politics in the United States found that women legislators are pursuing a reformist policy agenda in 
line with feminist expectations but are adapting to the current rules of the political game in 
procedure. The women are not satisfied with an adaptive role, however, and desire reform (Thomas 
1 994) . 
Similar research is now being developed in Australia. A project funded by the Australian Research 
Council and based at the University of Queensland wil provide the first comparative analysis of male 
and female parliamentarians in federal parliament. Parliamentary members of the ALP have been 
chosen, covering the period from 197 4 through to the 1996 election. The ALP was chosen for this 
study because, during the period under study, more women were elected from ALP ranks. 
In the decade leading up to the 1996 federal election, some two thirds of the women to enter 
parliament came from the ALP. The ALP has also pursued a more overt policy agenda aimed at 
promoting women both to close the gender gap and to achieve organisational change. As a party it 
is a good example of the worldwide trend of parties responding to women's demands for 
representation. The ALP responded to feminist initiatives demanding an increase in women's 
representation in the 1970s by adopting rhetorical strategies ,  which in turn led to further claims for 
action by women activists. In the 1980s the party adopted afative action strategies within its 
organisational wing and developed a comprehensive women's policy, and adopted and implemented 
an affirmative action program that effectively encouraged more women to run for political office. By 
the 1990s, this momentum translated into the adoption of the 35 per cent quota for women 
representatives within three elections. This momentum appears to have stalled at the 1996 federal 
election, with an influx of new Coalition women MPs and the decimation of Labor women. 
Until the 1996 election, ALP women parliamentarians have been in a unique position at the forefront 
of political change. In the pursuit of their reform agendas, they had to confront the problems that 
arise from a pattern of small, erratic increases in their numbers. Unlike their American sisters they 
had to deal with stronger party systems and the influence of factions. The party system exercises 
tight control over both preselection and the conduct of parliamentary business, and the factions 
dominate the preselection process and promotion within the parliament to positions on committees 
and elevation to Cabinet. 
Attention to party imperatives has presented a dilemma for ALP feminists. While feminists seek to 
transform parties into more 'woman friendly' places, they have risked incorporation by adaption to 
the rules of the game. They have generally kept to the rules of the political game whereby party 
divisions outweigh gender divisions, and factions have played a major role in this situation. Party 
and factional conditions have led to claims of dilution or co option of the women's agenda in the 
pecking order of the ALP structure. The feminist voice in Australian politics is probably not as 
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strong as it was in the first half of the 1980s partly due to the growth in the significance of the ALP's 
(unfeminised) internal factions (Sawer and Simms 1993 :34). 
All in all, ALP women MPs are well placed to provide some of the answers to the central question of 
whether women make a difference to politics. 
Making A Difference, More Or Less 
As a precursor to the Australian Research Council funded program, we relied on work done as an 
Honours thesis in the Department of Government examining the attitudes of ALP women 
parliamentarians in Queensland. This preliminary study sought to establish how one group of women 
parliamentarians experience public office, whether they think they have a distinctive role to play as 
women, and what they consider to be the principal obstacles they face. 
Confinning the pattern that women parliamentarians are now much more like their male colleagues in 
educational background and experience, this study found that all Queensland Labor women came 
from professional, political or union backgrounds. Almost half come from the teaching profession. 
Their age on attaining office ranged from 32 to 54 years. Despite these common backgrounds, most 
women felt that they had to bear more of the burden of juggling family commitments with their 
parliamentary careers. In the words of one MP : "I want to be with my kids . . .  men seem to be more 
willing not to be in their children's lives. " The women also resented the fact that they have to prove 
their credentials more rigorously than they believe men have to "women are judged by harsher 
standards . . .  a lot of male mediocrity is overlooked. "  
Despite these obstacles, the women perceived themselves to  be legislative reformers in pursuing 
women's issues policy. They pointed to their success in achieving real changes to the policy process 
despite their low numbers: "we have achieved a great deal. . . and that's from a male dominated 
parliament". They have made a significant start on achieving the women's policy agenda changes, 
and saw their agenda being advanced through a complex interplay of leadership, factions and support 
networks. 
The women felt they had achieved much, but their frustration and consciousness of the limitations 
imposed by gendered institutions showed. Of particular importance was the role of factions which 
the women feel they must deal with, but which inhibit their capacity to consolidate women's 
networks. The contrast between the few women interviewed from the federal parliament with their 
state sisters was striking. At the national level, women feel more confident in the ability to operate 
through a cross factional women's caucus .  At the state level, factions appear to have militated 
against any cross factional cooperation. 
The MPs have a common sense of the fact that being a woman is a distinct characteristic which 
imposes obligations and makes them aware of their distinctiveness. A sense of divided loyalty 
between representing their constituency and representing women is one element of the womens' 
ambivalence about role. They were particularly interested in seeing more women run for parliament 
and all of them had an understanding that this was not just about making the parliament more 
representative, but also facilitating the execution of a reform agenda that would make politics more 
responsive to women. 
Part of this reform agenda is educating male legislators to be more sensitive to women's concerns 
and women's issues. Many of the women MP's referred to the fact that they thought although women 
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were the first to put issues of concern to women on the agenda, male parliamentarians were starting 
to pick up these issues. One MP referred to "the time a man . . .  asked a question about 
tampons . . . . .  We had to be very careful that we didn't behave like giggling schoolgirls. Because we 
were amused . . .  and yet really we were very pleased. "  
The confidence that the women expressed in relation to their legislative role waned when they turned 
to the business of politics. The parliamentary environment remains hostile and the women were at 
the stage of drawing attention to this fact, rather than developing an agenda for change. 
The Queensland Labor women MPs reported incidences of sexism in their parliamentary colleagues. 
They were not comfortable or satisfied with the way business is conducted in the parliament, 
describing it with comments like "appalling",  " too confrontational, antagonistic" ,  "totally 
uncomfortable" .  Sitting hours, the manner and style of debate, the noise and shouting, the length of 
time allotted for speeches were considered the worst aspects. The adversarial nature of the 
parliamentary system was perceived to be the major obstacle to real change. Other obstacles were 
the Cabinet system of government: "as a backbencher you have no influence", and low numbers and 
factional division. They felt that having more women would give them the necessary confidence to 
pursue change in procedures.  Their goals reflected this:  change the sitting hours, use committees to 
remove the adversarial nature of the chamber, reduce the time for speeches, try to reach consensus 
more often, reduce the shouting and heckling/harassment, and make parliament a more "family
friendly" institution. 
Clearly, much research still needs to be done to untangle the complex relationship between numbers, 
feminism, partisanship, and institutional power. The research project being conducted at the 
University of Queensland will be an important step in that direction. 
Thanks are due to Dr. Patty Renfrow and Sonya Palmieri, the fellow members of the research team 
working on the ARC project 
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BATTERED W OMAN SYNDROME AND SELF DEFENCE: 
RECONCILING A W OMAN'S ROLE AS VICTIM AND PERPETRATOR 
Nicole Robinson is completing her LLB at the University of Queensland. In this paper she 
examines the nature of 'Battered Woman Syndrome' (BWS) and how it intersects with self defence 
at law. Ms Robinson explores the reception of BWS in the courts and concludes that although 
evidence of BWS enables women a fairer reception, it falls far short of achieving justice for 
battered women. 
INTRODUCTION 
The study of family violence began in the 1960's .  At that time there were almost no reports of 
abused wives. Those reports which did arise, attributed the assaults to personality disorders in both 
the women and the men. Violence in families was thought to be infrequent and a result of the 
psychopathology in the individuals involved, rather than a society wide problem.i Today, the 
phenomenon of wife abuse is no secret and the courts in USA, Canada and Australia have 
acknowledged the covert war being waged against women by their male partners. The courts have 
struggled over the last twenty to thirty years to keep up with our changing perceptions of the roles of 
women and men within society. Domestic violence, once a shameful secret, has become a criminal 
activity punishable by the law. This topic was recently thrust into the international spotlight by the 
notorious OJ Simpson trial. The roles of the parties to that alleged crime, as painted by the media, 
were clear cut. The woman was the victim, even if the murderer' s  identity remained undisclosed. 
What happens when the person traditionally "the victim" breaks the mould and becomes "the 
perpetrator"? What evidence does the court have regard to when "the victim" has taken action 
causing the death of "the abuser"? 
Recently, the Australian courts have accepted a relatively "new" psychological analysis of battered 
women known as "Battered Woman Syndrome". "Battered Woman Syndrome" (BWS) has been 
raised by defence lawyers as evidence upon which a court is invited to completely acquit women who 
have killed their violent husbands or partners . BWS has also been accepted in courts on behalf of 
accused women in matters of assault, breaking, entering and stealing and defrauding the Department 
of Social Security. ii I will concentrate on the use of "Battered Woman Syndrome" (BWS) in cases 
of alleged murder or manslaughter by women of their violent partners. It is noted that if the 
argument of self defence is raised successfully in court it results in the complete acquittal of the 
accused in a murder trial. This essay will examine the following issues; firstly, what is BWS ?, 
secondly, how does BWS intersect with the self defence under the law and reconcile the woman' s  
roles as victim and perpetrator of violence? and thirdly, the responses of feminist critics to BWS and 
its acceptance by the judiciary. This paper seeks to demonstrate that BWS falls far short of achieving 
justice for battered women under the law. It also acknowledges, however, that evidence of BWS 
affords women in violent relationships a more just reception by the courts than they have ever 
previously been afforded. 
WHAT IS "BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME"? 
"Battered Woman Syndrome" is a psychological condition which results from the cumulative and 
devastating effects of exposure to continued and often severe physical , sexual and/or psychological 
abuse. iii BWS does not explain why the violence occurs in the first place. A battered woman is 
defined as any woman who has been the victim of physical, sexual and/or psychological abuse by her 
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partner. BWS is a collection of specific characteristics and effects of abuse that results in a woman's  
decreased ability to respond effectively to the violence against her. Mary Ann Douglas suggests not 
all women who are battered suffer from BWS but those who do become psychologically entrapped in 
a violent relationship. iv In the United States, an estimated 1 .8 million women are physically abused by 
their partners every year and Australian statistics suggest violence occurs in somewhere between one 
in three and one in ten families. v 
BWS focuses on the psychology of the battered woman. Many different explanations of why "the 
women stay" are aired under the banner of BWS . For example, feminist authors, Dee Graham, Edna 
Rawlings and Nelly Rimini draw parallels between the battered women ' s  minimisation of the life­
threatening nature of the abuse and the Stockholm Syndrome, which accounts for the paradoxical 
psychological responses of hostages to their captors.vi Dr Lenore Walker identifies BWS in terms of 
the "learned helplessness" model of depression, whereby the battered woman may feel ultimately 
helpless to stop the violence against her, (even though in cases of murder she has clearly displaced 
this passive role). vii BWS does not blame battered women for the occurrence of violence against 
them like the masochism theory. Rather it recognises and labels the devastating impact on women 
from the battering they experience. Most importantly, it explains to the judge and jury why the 
woman did not leave a potentially life threatening relationship. The battered woman is unable to 
leave the battering relationship because she possesses a variety of "emotional, cognitive and 
behavioural deficits . . .  which negatively influence her from leaving a relationship after the battering 
occurs. , ,viii The American Psychological Association suggests BWS is generally accepted in the 
psychological community. ix 
HOW "BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME" INTERSECTS WITH SELF-DEFENCE? 
Margaret Davies makes the following three points in her general analysis of the masculine nature of 
the law. Firstly, men have written the law. Secondly, the law reflects male values which reinforce 
oppressions of gender, race, class and sexuality in various ways. Thirdly, traditional legal theory is 
patriarchal because it usually purports to present a view of the law which is supposed to explain its 
general characteristics. Accordingly, if there is a "neutral" or "objective" way of seeing things, then 
those of us who do not share it are more likely to accept the characterisation of our own views as 
distorted or biased and consequently, attempt to fit them into the dominant mould. 
Applying Margaret Davies '  three-point analysis, the patriarchal values of Australian society have 
clearly influenced the law in relation to self defence. Counsel wishing to raise the issue of self­
defence in cases of inter personal violence must establish whatever force the accused used was 
reasonably necessary to defend themselves against assault. Under the traditional interpretation of 
self defence it is incredibly difficult to demonstrate the battered woman's  actions were "reasonably 
necessary" where the partner was not in the act of attacking the woman at the time she killed or 
injured him, as in Runjanjic and Kontinnen ' s  case.x Stubbs and Tolmie note that some of the legal 
rules which shaped the self defence doctrine, "were designed by the courts to a factual paradigm 
involving a one off confrontational encounter between two strangers of roughly equal size and 
strength. , ,xi The concepts of imminence, proportionality and duty to retreat, to which the court has 
regard are clearly evocative of a one off encounter. This negates women' s  experience of violence at 
the hands of intimates which are generally repetitive and occur over extended periods of time. 
Angela Browne highlights the traditional view of the courts that assaults of wives by their husbands 
were family rather than legal matters.xii Historically, the home and family are the private domain 
which women inhabit and into which the law should not intrude. Only men should inhabit the public 
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sphere of politics and market. Patricia Smith explains how this cultural assumption makes women 
dependent on men and subject to their authority. xiii These oppressive values have informed the 
courts ' interpretation of the applicability of the self-defence doctrine in cases where battered women 
assault or kill their violent partners. It is significant that before evidence of BWS became admissible 
in court, there were no reported cases of women who had killed their violent partners gaining a 
complete acquittalxiv, with the exception of the The Queen v Rxv. Since 1987 the law relating to self
defence focuses on the question of whether or not the defensive action was necessary in the 
circumstances, following the High Court in Zevecevic.xvi . However, the concepts of imminence, 
proportionality, serious harm and the duty to retreat remain informal considerations which do not 
have the status of legal rules. These considerations are impregnated with the patriarchal notions 
referred to above by Angela Browne and Margaret Davies and still inform court decisions today. 
The acceptance judicially of BWS signals a recognition of the above limitations of the law in relation 
to battered women. The effects on the accused of the pre existing abusive relationship has only been 
viewed as relevant in Australia since evidence of BWS was accepted by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Lavalleexvii . In Lavallee, the Canadian Supreme Court upheld a trial judgement permitting 
a psychiatrist to testify both as to BWS generally and as to his opinion that the accused suffered from 
BWS . Elizabeth Sheehy lists three new considerations the court had regard to in the defence of the 
battered woman in Lavallee; 
"( 1 )  the accused' s  situation did not meet the traditional paradigm of self defence as the 
deceased apparently threatened to get her "later", after their guests had gone home, and the accused 
fired the gun at the back of the deceased' s head as he was leaving the bedroom; 
(2) the judgement clearly stated that women who are in violent situations are entitled to use 
self defence when they have acted in anticipation of violence threatened in the future, that they need 
not wait to face the uplifted knife before they take action; and 
(3) the woman need not fit some stereotype of passivity or "helplessness" to receive the 
benefits of BWS evidence, since the Court recognised that such a woman may have fought back or 
attempted to leave while still being victimised and desperate to save herself."xviii 
Runjanjic and Kontinnen is the first Australian case in which the court allowed the admission 
evidence of BWS . In so allowing, King CJ, of the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal, 
suggested the evidence concerning BWS was admissible because domestic violence, at least when it 
is habitual and severe, is so special and unusual it outside common knowledge or ordinary 
experience.xix In that case, involving a domestic triangle between the two women and their joint 
violent de facto, Hil, Kontinnen admitted shooting Hill while he slept after he had threatened to kil 
her, Runjanjic and a child. The South Australian Supreme Court accepted self defence, as supported 
by evidence of BWS and acquitted Kontinnen of murder. In Hickeyxx evidence concerning BWS was 
introduced in support of a successful plea of self defence. Hickey stabbed her violent ex-de facto 
after he had refused to allow her to leave his house with their children and had attacked her. He was 
sitting with his back to her at the time she stabbed him but the accused testified she did not believe 
his attack on her was over. 
While it is arguable that Australian courts have generally accepted evidence of BWS to support 
women ' s  pleas of self defence, the outcomes for the women involved in these trials are inconsistent 
and seemingly arbitrary. In Muy Ky Chay, Gilbert and Buzzacott, the defendants raised both self­
defence and provocation and were all found guilty of manslaughter. There is a commonly held belief 
amongst feminist writers that battered women should have the opportunity, where a history of abuse 
within the relationship is established, to be completely acquitted.xxi At present, Stubbs and Tolmie' s  
research suggests a complete acquittal i s  an unlikely result for women accused of murder or 
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manslaughter of their violent partners. In Raby's  case, BWS was only used to support the partial 
defence of provocation rather than the full defence of self defence. BWS appears to be failing 
battered women in the manner in which defence counsel employ it and the weight courts place on 
BWS evidence in their rulings. 
HOW HA VE FEMINIST CRITICS RECEIVED BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME? 
BWS was identified by feminist analyst Dr Walker after her team of women collected data from 
battered women in a supportive and non-threatening environment. The Canadian Supreme Court in 
Lavallee clearly heralded its own acceptance of evidence of BWS as a major step forward for 
battered women. Catherine MacKinnon' s  radical feminist view of the issue of gender is also 
seemingly sympathetic to the valid and valuable role fulfilled by BWS. xxii For MacKinnon, at the 
centre of women ' s  experience is the experience of being victimised. Following MacKinnon' s  analysis 
of men ' s  domination of women, BWS explains to the court how battered women adopt the role of 
victim, (which male power attributes them) . This role is not enough to protect the women from their 
violent partners and they are therefore forced to take extraordinary action, normally beyond the 
bounds of their defined victim role. These arguments supporting the use of BWS seem to point to 
the already constructed nature of women and society. They acknowledge the male power that does 
exist within society to the detriment of women 
Many feminist authors, however, take issue with the fundamental observations which inform the 
concept of BWS . Stubbs and Tolmie point to the dangers of the over emphasis BWS places on the 
woman' s  psychology and consequent under emphasis on the context in which the offence took place. 
They believe BWS reinforces the notion the accused' s  behaviour was not objectively reasonable but 
perhaps only reasonable in light of some psychological state which resulted from her experience as a 
victim of ongoing violence. This reinforces notions of women 's  irationality and makes the 
generalisation that battered women as a group share certain psychological characteristics. xxiii Therese 
McCarthy, in her examination of the use of BWS to support the defence of provocation in R v Raby, 
concludes, "Margaret Raby ' s  own version of events within the marriage, including her experiences of 
those events, were ultimately subordinated to the "psy" disciplines, those discourses of psychology 
and psychiatry. She appears to have almost entirely lost her agency."xxiv 
Anne Coughlin agrees with the feminist criticism of BWS as insitutionalising negative stereotypes of 
women but believes this criticism does not strike at the true heart of the issue. For Coughlin, the 
legal theory of responsibility is incapable of accomodating women' s  experiences without judging 
women to be deviant from the human model actor. Actors who do not possess the capacity for 
responsible conduct may not be punished criminally, however, the decision to excuse them 
constitutes a negative statement about their status as moral agents. In Coughlin' s  analysis, BWS 
excuses women by making their activity a "mental health disorder", rather than illustrating that their 
actions were based upon a realistic belief such action was essential to protect their lives.xxv 
Coughlin argues that feminist proponents of BWS unwittingly embrace the same misogynistic 
assumptions about women' s  helplessness to govern their own lives that have been used thn;mghout 
the ages to deprive women of control of their lives. Rather than depicting women as trapped in a 
violent relationship by a paralysing mental disorder, Coughlin refers to research suggesting a battered 
woman may choose to remain in a violent relationship out of a conviction she has a responsibility to 
care for her troubled spouse and to sustain the network of family life, especially to assure the welfare 
of her children.xxvi Coughlin' s  argument highlights the argument of liberal feminists that women are 
treated not as individuals but rather as a class. Their roles within violent relationships as "battered 
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women" have been judged not according to liberal criterion of individuality but according to ascribed 
conventions of womanhood, such as psychological entrapment and helplessness. 
Stubbs and Tolmie use American and Australian research to analyse the ways BWS may fail to serve 
Aboriginal women, for example, by its narrow focus on self defence rather than defence of children 
or other clan members, or, because Aboriginal women may not seek criminal justice intervention 
because these institutions replicate relations of dominance and racism and their intervention may put 
the men and the women at greater risk of state violence, or, because Aboriginal women may see 
alcohol as playing a significant role in the violence not recognised by accounts of battering that focus 
singularly on patriarchy.xxvii 
CONCLUSION: STILL NO SOLUTION FOR THE FEMALE VICTIM/PERPETRATOR 
The use of BWS to establish the argument of self defence in cases where battered women have 
assaulted or killed violent partners is problematic. As discussed above, BWS evidence has been 
brought in to to acknowledge the effects of violent relationships on battered women who allegedly 
commit offences against their partners. The effects of these relationships set cases of violence 
committed by battered women against their violent partners apart from other criminal cases. BWS 
was clearly researched by Dr Walker with a view to exposing the domination of women by men in 
society. In this light, BWS is a breakthrough as a means of gaining recognition by the courts of the 
power imbalance present in the "private" sphere of the family. However, negative stereotypes of 
women as weak and subordinate creatures seem to have informed the use of BWS in arguments of 
self defence. These cultural values form the premises on which BWS itself is based. BWS , as a 
product of the "psy" disciplines, is open to the criticism of treating women as a class rather than as 
individuals. It disempowers women, refusing to acknowledge their decisions and actions, declaring 
them passive victims a description clearly at odds with their alleged behaviour. The perhaps most 
disturbing concern raised by feminist critics is the "invisibility of the battering man in legal 
discourse". This fact was highlighted by McCarthy ' s  analysis of Raby ' s  case. While the law focuses 
on the psychology of the battered woman it will continue to neglect the role of male violence in and 
male responsibility for domestic violence related offences. BWS certainly collaborates effectively 
with this silent enemy of equality. While courts and psychologists probe ever deeper into the 
woman' s  psyche, the behaviour of the violent male ' s  remains unconsidered. In the meantime, 
battered women need whatever protection our legal system can afford them. Until judicial attention 
and law reform focusses on the role of the male in domestic violence related offences, BWS at least 
goes some way towards achieving a more equitable result for these women at trial. 
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CRITIQUING CRIMINOLOGY 
Emma Ogilvie is a PhD student within the University of Queensland, Department of Sociology. Her 
area of speciality is juvenile crime and justice . Ms Ogilvie's paper presents a theoretical discussion 
regarding the role females play in crime. She argues that women play a much larger role than the 
5:1 male/female ratio contemporary criminology suggests. 
The focus of this critique is the way in which criminology has explained differences in female and 
male offending through utilising traditional sex role stereotypes. In attempting to explain the 
apparent under representation of females with respect to criminal activity, mainstream criminology 
has situated females within stereotypic understandings of femininity which fail to recognise, let alone 
explain, their actual criminal activities when they do offend. When feminists have examined the issue 
of females and crime they have tended to adopt similar sex stereotypes to those utilised by their 
male stream colleagues. Typically the focus has been on supposedly sex specific crimes such as 
shoplifting and prostitution. Women's involvement in non 'traditional' crime, such as assault or break 
and enters, has been explained away as somehow aberrant (Smart, 1976). 
The utilisation of sex stereotypes as a theoretical tool has been carried over from traditional 
criminology of the fifties and even earlier, to criminological theory in the nineties. If we turn to the 
pioneering work of criminologists such as Cohen and Sutherland and Cressey the reliance on sex role 
stereotypes in their theorising of gender and crime is striking. 
'Subcultural theory', as initially extolled by Albert Cohen ( 1955), has been one of the most influential 
streams in criminological theory. Cohen's basic premise was that working class males experience 
" status discontent" due to a lack of opportunity to achieve middle class lifestyles. This in turn leads 
to the formation of deviant subculture groups which violate accepted (middle class) codes of 
behaviour. According to Cohen the male delinquent's objectives correlate with those of his middle 
class brother. Power, aggression, mastery and pursuit are all valued as desirable achievements and 
correspond with the masculine role ( 1955 : 1 39).  The delinquent then, is a "rogue male", representing 
pure "untrammelled masculinity" ( 1955: 140) . 
The higher levels of males then females involved in criminal behaviour was explained by Cohen as 
representing the masculine desire for achievement and power, while the adolescent girl desires 
"relationships with the opposite sex and those personal qualities which affect the ability to establish 
such relationships" ( 1 955 :  142). Women are supposedly less involved in delinquency · because it 
threatens their femininity. Indeed, activities of the kind sponsored within delinquent subcultures were 
regarded by Cohen as "positively inappropriate" for young girls. Delinquent activities threaten the 
feminine sex role because of their "strongly masculine symbolic function" ( 1955: 143 144). 
This view was not uncommon within traditional criminological theory. Hagan, from the control 
school, described his male juveniles as becoming involved in delinquency because of "a spirit of 
liberation, the opportunity to take risks, and a chance to pursue publicly some of the pleasures that 
are symbolic of adult male status outside the family" (Hagan et al, 1979: 29) Women, in contrast, 
are trained, by their mothers, to be compliant. They become objects of dependence, submissiveness 
and passivity (Hagan et al, 1979 in Naffine 1987 : 69) .  Similarly, Sutherland and Cressey explained 
the gender ratio as resulting from the fact that "from infancy girls are taught that they must be nice, 
whilst boys are taught that they must be rough and tough" (Sutherland and Cressey, 1979: 1 30) . 
For Sutherland and Cressey, delinquent behaviour "can be integrated with the masculine adolescent 
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role, but it cannot do so for the basic features of the feminine role" (Sutherland and Cressey, 1 979: 
1 30) . 
It is important to understand that whilst Cohen and his cohort were writing 40 years ago, these ideas 
are still being propounded by many current theorists. Braithwaite explains women's apparent lesser 
involvement in crime as being due to women's situation of dependency on either the family of 
orientation or that of procreation. Women are thus more socially integrated and "never quite as free 
to make deviant choices as the male" ( 1989: 92) . To take another example, Katz ( 1 988)  argues that 
the act of a 'stickup' extends a particular experience of being masculine or a 'hardman' where "the 
phallic metaphor embodied in the ways of the badass [makes sense] to virtually no women" (Katz, 
1988 : 238).  Criminal acts are given as: 
a way of elaborating, perhaps celebrating, distinctively male forms of action and ways of being, 
such as collective drinking and gambling on street comers, interpersonal physical challenges and 
moral tests , cocky posturing and arrogant claims to back up "tough" fronts (Katz, 1988 :  247). 
An example from the 1990's is White ( 1 990) , who argues that during an era where high 
unemployment constrains traditional avenues of masculinity maintenance, car theft constitutes an 
avenue where young boys can confirm their masculinity. The introduction by White of wider issues 
such as youth unemployment constitutes an admirable expansion of the gender/criminality issue. 
Unfortunately, however, White frequently appears to slip into simply adding wider social issues to 
gender stereotypes rather then using understandings of larger social factors to move beyond 
simplistic stereotypes of gender. White attempts to explain how the relationship between gender 
identity, motor vehicles and criminality is socially constructed. According to White, for many men, 
"the car becomes indelibly stamped into their consciousness as a key symbol of masculinity" 
( 1990: 1 24 1 25) .  For women however, the experience of driving a car is qualitatively different. 
Because of the limited exposure they have to social constructions of the car they are more likely to 
view the car in specifically functional terms. For men the theft of cars allows an expression of virility 
where the danger, the speed, the noise and the thrill of it all is very much physical and 'sexual' in 
character ( 1 990: 1 24). For women if it is going to symbolically represent anything it is freedom 
( 1 990: 1 27) .  
White argues that "the low wages of young women who find paid work, and the low unemployment 
benefits for young people, are forcing many young women to stay in the parental home, or to return 
to it after a spell on their own" ( 1 990: 1 26) . This results i "infantilisation" where, through their 
dependency, young women are forced into performing excessive domestic duties.  For young women, 
their response to this constrained position is linked to "an ideological definition of 'female problems' 
that sees them as internal to the individual woman" ( 1 990: 127). Young men however, when 
unemployed and living at home, are not subject to the same conditions or the same pressure to 
internalise rather than externalise discomfort with their constrained location within an oppressive 
social structure. Males are said to have far greater access to freedom of movement and hence 
freedom of action for "on the street they will find ready peer support which is expressed according 
to the various conceptions of working class masculinity" ( 1 990: 1 27) .  Because of their position 
within a class structure, car theft holds appeal for working class males, an appeal which is intensified 
by material factors such as lack of transport and public infrastructure. Crime also holds the 
additional appeal of being "rich in excitement, a dramatic break from the tedium and boredom of 
being wageless in a consumer society" ( 1990: 1 28) .  In essence, for White, stealing a car is an 
afation that one is indeed "a man" ( 1990: 1 28) .  By corollary, since females do not have to prove 
themselves a man, they do not have to steal cars. 
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It is interesting to explore how White's examination of masculinity and car theft, whilst superficially 
plausible, could easily be inverted. Using White's rationale, one might argue that females are in fact, 
more likely to steal cars given the confinement dictated by social norms and the "freedom" and 
"escape" that a car offers. If they do face greater obstacles in legitimately obtaining a driving licence 
and vehicle than males do, then theft could well seem an attractive option. Presumably the 
excitement and drama crime provides could also be perceived as a welcome break for girls from 
their routinised gender role since surely White would allow the girls to be as conscious as the boys of 
the unfair restrictions placed upon them, and just as aware as the boys of a more profitable way of 
escaping tedium and boredom. White's explanation of gender and crime fails one of the most basic 
requirements of any theory, ie that it be falsifiable. If official statistics were to display an over, rather 
then under representation of females, White's theory would be equally adequate in explaining the 
phenomenon. From White' s  perspective, one could argue that the reason girls commit more c.Time 
than boys is that they have a greater need to escape gender confinement within the domestic sphere. 
Boys, on the other hand, are less likely to become delinquent because the avenues open to be 
masculine are more varied and more easily accessible in wider society. The argument presented is 
what Allen neatly describes as 'tautological role theory' .  Men commit crime because crime is 
masculine, and women do not because crime is masculine (Allen, 1989 : 28). 
Interestingly, whilst many of these male theorists have been criticised by feminist criminologists (see 
Allen, 1989; Edwards, 1989; Naffine, 1987) ,  the use of gender stereotypes has not been confined to 
males. One of the earliest feminist forays into criminology was that by Carol Smart ( 1 976) in her text 
Women, Crime and Criminology. In explaining shoplifting Smart claimed that "women are 
predominantly shoppers for household items and food and the techniques of shoplifting, unlike the 
techniques which might be required for other offences, such as theft and burglary, are available to 
them as shoppers" ( 1 97 6:9 1 0) .  Because her theoretical perspective relied on sex role stereotypes 
Smart's research was unable to satisfactorily address the issue of male shoplifting. In this respect 
Smart simply mirrored the inadequacies of the main stream male criminologists. 
There has been some movement in the discipline however. Judith Allen presents a new outlook in 
feminist criminology which incorporates corporeal feminism and feminist philosophy via theorists 
such as Gatens ( 1 988)  and Grosz ( 1987; 1990) .  Allen argues that sex lias consistently been identified 
as the strongest predictor of criminal behaviour so that "capacity to explain the high sex ratio and 
sexed character of many criminal practices might then be posed as a litmus test for the viability of the 
discipline" ( 1990: 2 1 ) .  Allen's primary argument is that men, as a sex, as opposed to masculinity as a 
gender, needs to be considered when attempting to understand the sex ratio in crime. She asserts 
that criminology has failed to theorise men as a sex because its dependence on the sex/gender 
distinction shifts the focus away from men and women to masculinity and femininity. Allen argues 
that even Feminist Criminology has fallen into the trap of assuming a sex/ gender distinction so that 
feminist critiques of criminology's  focus on masculinity are inherently flawed because they are unable 
to address men or women as sexed beings ( 1 990: 23) 
Allen argues that if we wish to address the sex ratio in crime we need to relinquish "the sex/gender 
distinction, the mind body split and other related dichotomies" (Allen, 1989 : 2 1 )  as well as 
reformulate the theoretical objectives that these concepts have served. Unfortunately, while many of 
Allen's notions are useful in highlighting the focus on masculinity endemic to criminology, they are 
not supported by any empirical data and in some of her claims she is simply wrong. It is just not true 
to assert (via Gross) that "the female body was subjected to an intensive criminological gaze; the 
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male body was evacuated, disallowed, disavowed (Gross, cited in Allen 1989:22). Allen concludes 
with the question: 
what is it about men, not as working class,  not as migrant, not as underprivileged individual, but as 
men that induces them to commit crime? Here it is no longer women who are judged by the norms of 
masculinity and found to be the problem. Now it is men and not humanity who are openly 
acknowledged as the objects and subjects of investigation (Grosz, 1987: 6 cited in Allen, 1990: 39) 
While such statements no doubt provide enormously liberating imagery for many feminists, with 
respect to criminology, they are not only unfounded but outright destructive. Whilst the disillusion of 
many feminists with the concept of gender is easy to understand there is no need to abandon the 
concept completely to an optimistic revivification of sex. Acceptance of Allen's argument depends 
upon overlooking the fact that, for al its shortcomings, criminology over the past forty years has 
unambiguously demonstrated the importance of factors such as poverty, dysfunctional family 
background, access to education/employment opportunities and geographical context as contributing 
to criminal behaviour. Whilst it could, and should, be argued that each of these factors entails 
sex/gender dimensions, this is not the argument Allen presents. Such an argument requires a 
recognition of the way sex/gender interacts both additively and multiplicatively with a wide range of 
other social factors. Allen, however, seeks to cut through what she sees as confusion, by recasting 
the complex and multi causal phenomenon of crime to a mono causal elaboration of maleness. 
The focus on maleness as the crucial factor in understanding crime completely denies the experience 
of women as a sex who are engaged in criminal activity. Are we going to say that females who 
commit crimes have been corporeally inscribed with the attributes of maleness which is why they 
become engaged in such a male activity or is it because they have been so oppressed by a 
phallocentric society that they are enacting maleness as an expression of resistance? In short are we 
really going to deny women agency, responsibility, self determination and the ability to derive 
pleasure from criminal activities? 
While many theorists are claiming that the vital issue criminology needs to explore is "the 
masculinity of criminality" (Allen, 1988 ,  1989; Carrington, 1993),  I would argue that the masculinity 
of criminality has been an altogether unhelpful obsession of criminological theory. This obsession 
clouds our understandings of gender and crime as well as obstructing the examination of the ways in 
which males as well as females may be differentially dealt with by the justice system. 
In arguing that criminology has been overly reliant upon sex role stereotypes when addressing issues 
of gender it is important to recognise that this is a consequence of the relative infancy of the 
discipline as a whole. If we think about other factors we know to be implicated in criminality such as 
social class or neighbourhood context, there is a general recognition and acceptance of the fact that 
many factors are operating simultaneously in a complex, additive and multiplicative fashion. One's 
class position influences where one lives which influences the educational opportunities one has 
access to which influences the cultural capital available and so on. When it comes to gender 
however, the complexity taken for granted in other spheres is disavowed and simplistic uni 
dimensional caricatures of femininity and masculinity embraced. This is not to say that there are no 
theorists concerned with challenging and broadening our understandings (see Alder, 1993,  1994; 
Campbell, 198 1 ;  Carrington, 1 993; Cunneen, 1 994; White, 1990 ) .  There are of course other 
theorists sensitive to the issues being raised in this paper and addressing them as such. In criticising 
the "mainstream" this paper seeks to be one more contribution towards re orienting the focus of 
mainstream criminology. i 
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" W OMAN'S BODY, W OMAN'S CHOICE" ? :  
LIMITATIONS ON THE IDEA O F  O WNING YOUR BODY. 
Kylie Stephen is completing her PhD within the Department of Government at the 
University of Queensland. Ms. Stephen's  paper has as its focus the concept of "bodily 
integrity" and the limitations it holds for women, in particular feminists who utilise its 
construction as the basis for argument about abortion and surrogacy. 
Within contemporary social and political culture, rights claimed for individual autonomy 
are often phrased in terms of 'bcxlily integrity'. For example, those who oppose the 
sterilisation of the intellectually disabled, do so on the basis that the state should not have 
the power to authorise the invasion of the physical integrity of any human being; those 
who support a woman's right to abortion often forward the argument that it is a woman's 
body therefore a woman's choice. In both examples the understanding invoked is one of 
ownership of property in the body. Protecting bodily integrity equates with preventing 
unwanted violations of the body therefore maintaining strict control and ownership of the 
body. But just how universal is this understanding of the body? Specifically, how are 
women positioned in relation to such a conception? 
My aim for this paper is to focus on women's agency in the instances of abortion and 
surrogacy, in order to highlight the problems for women in claiming individual 
reproductive rights based on the liberal notion of bcxlily integrity as proprietal subjectivity 
or bcxlily ownership. Consequently, I argue that present laws relating to abortion and 
surrogacy, based on claims to bodily integrity as proprietal subjectivity, can be perceived 
as potentially limiting. A tension is apparent between women's perceptions of their own 
bodily integrity and that of the dominant cultural construct. 
What do we mean by bodily integrity? 
The concept of bcxlily integrity has its roots in the theory of John Locke and the liberal 
political tradition more generally. The body is seen as a possession, a property of the 
subject. This is clearly illustrated in Locke's famous dictum, "every man [sic] has a 
property in his own person" . 1 Through this statement Locke severed the rational agent 
from their body, giving the subject property rights over the body and its products. 
Property in the person is one of the central tenets on which modem liberal society turns. 
The individual owns their body just as they would own other material property. The 
individual's property can be contracted out without injury to the person who owns the 
property. The individual's task is to ensure their self protection whereby their property is 
not infringed upon. The individual recognises others as property owners too. Without this 
recognition, others will appear as potential property to be owned, and thus equality 
between individuals becomes nonexistent. 
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Significantly, ownership of the body, is premised on a 'universal' view of the body in 
abstraction and isolation from society. This notion of bodily integrity is premised on a 
system of gender relations that reflect the hierarchical relationship between the mind and 
body. Such a model of bodily integrity, and hence subjectivity, formulates perceptions of 
appropriate masculine and feminine behaviour and attitudes towards male and female 
bodies. Men are characterised as representing the universal view. The (perceived) view of 
the relationship between themselves and their bodies is one of control and abstraction from 
cultural constraint. Women are characterised as having an insufficient external relation to 
their bodies. Their 'natural' biology is seen to allow everyday violations of their bodily 
integrity (through sexual intercourse and pregnancy), subverting the hierarchy of mind 
over body. Women are not perceived as being able to control their bodies as men do. 
Feminist attempts to frame and reframe abortion and surrogacy laws remain within this 
cultural structure, whereby the body is conceived as property. Consequently, such laws are 
not only ineffective and limited in terms of protecting women's 'rights' to bodily integrity 
but they also deny women equality before the law because they are premised on the 
conception of bodily integrity as proprietal subjectivity. I argue that there are serious 
problems with the parameters of this cultural construction and the implications it has for 
women. I shall mention only two such problems here. 
Problems with proprietal subjectivity. 
In the first example, where feminist discourse on surrogacy maintains as its focus the 
notion of contract, in which the body is perceived as a commodity to be hired out and 
controlled, women stand in a problematic relationship to the concept of bodily integrity as 
proprietal subjectivity. Clearly, arguments for contract pregnancy depend on an analogy 
between the work of pregnancy and wage labour. Advocates of contract pregnancy 
distinguish it from baby selling on the basis that it is not the child or foetus that the woman 
is selling, but only her gestational services. 2 But in what manner is the pain of childbirth 
analogous to the physical and psychological demands of other forms of wage labour? Is 
proprietal subjectivity an appropriate premise for the labour of pregnancy and other wage 
labour? 
Carole Pateman argues that wage labour is premised on a flawed notion of the proprietal 
subject, that assumes it is possible to abstract labour power from the worker's self or sense 
of being. "From the standpoint of contract, the [surrogate mother] is an owner of property 
in her person who contracts out part of that property in the market".3 The surrogate is 
seen to stand in an external relation to the property in her person, where she sells a service 
but not herself. Even where no money changes hands (for example, with so called 
altruistic surrogacy) , the assumption is still that the woman can divorce herself from her 
body and its product. Pateman contends,  however, that "there is an integral relationship 
between the body and the self' .4 "The body and the self are not identical, but selves are 
inseparable from bodies" .5 For Pateman, surrogacy involves a very high level of self 
alienation because the work of pregnancy may contribute to women's understandings of 
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themselves. This renders problematic the idea of bodily ownership being central to self 
autonomy and determination. 
The surrogacy contract appears to be a free and equal exchange because the notion of the 
individual as a proprietal subject has been extended to women, thus making sexual 
difference irelevant to reproduction. By giving women this kind of right to sovereignty 
over their own bodies, a space for women's autonomy is seen to be established. But where 
the surrogacy contract is upheld on this basis, the social context in which the right to 
surrogacy operates, based as it is on a problematic distinction between the agent and her 
body, goes unexamined. 
The question of surrogacy highlights two issues. The first, is "the importance we give to 
human embodiment in our understanding of the self and its freedom" .6 Clearly, liberal 
theory has not given enough importance to the effect sex difference has on the 
development of the autonomous self. The legal enforcement of pregnancy contracts 
reinforces notions of human separateness and atomism rather than recognising that 
selfhood and autonomy develop through sustained and intimate human relations. Second, 
surrogacy highlights "the tension between promoting freedom through contracts on the 
one hand and the recognition and preservation of noncontractual human relationships on 
the other" .7 Not al human relationships are contractual. In recognising a sense of the 
autonomous self as developed in relations, the (potential) violation of a woman's self, in 
pregnancy, may be founded on the fact that for some women, because pregnancy may 
af the self in connection to others, surrogacy cannot be seen as just gestational 
services. Or to any degree that pregnancy can be seen in this way, surrogacy must be the 
kind of service that women must be free to decline. Autonomy might not just be about 
using your body as you wish, rather autonomy may also depend on being able to define the 
self independent of cultural constraints. The freedom not to do something is just as 
important as the freedom to do something. When the woman and the foetus can be 
perceived as simultaneously distinct and interrelated entities, to speak of the freedom or 
autonomy of the woman as residing in her intention to enter into surrogacy contracts 
misunderstands the idea of autonomy. The idea that contracts are therefore the 
paradigmatic bond that link people in society is subverted by the possibility of determining 
the subject differently. 
In the second example, for women advocating safe abortion, the problems with utilising 
the language of rights becomes strikingly apparent when the language is exploited by pro
life candidates and turned against them. It is easy to see how the principle of individuality 
and control over one's body may be appropriated by abortion opponents for reactionary 
deployment. It becomes apparent that regardless of who uses terms like 'choice', 'privacy', 
and 'rights' ,  they belong to a single set of assumptions about the abstract individual and 
proprietal subjectivity. As such, the impasse within the abortion debate stems from the 
difficulty in establishing just whose rights will be declared legitimate and given priority 
status for preservation those of the woman or the foetus when rights are premised on 
liberal individualism. 
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The language of rights coincides with a set of assumptions about the nature of the 
individual who possesses those rights. The argument for abstract rights assumes a set of 
social conditions that define those rights, and limits who has access to them. The nature 
of the individual is, in tum, bound to a set of assumptions about gender. "Rights are by 
definition, claims that are staked within a given order of things and relationships" ,  they 
cannot be derived in abstraction from social relations. 8 It is insufficient to defend abortion 
rights on the basis that they protect women from unwanted invasions of their bodily 
integrity. Abortion rights need to be defended on much broader grounds because claiming 
abortion rights on the basis of avoiding a violation of bodily integrity assumes the 
atomistic individual of liberalism is the rights bearer, and denies the ability of all those 
whose sense of self and personal autonomy is derived through other ways to claim such 
rights. 
Marie Ashe argues that while the model of pregnancy that defines the reproductive 
process in terms of discontinuity rather than continuity may be an adequate description of 
some women's experiences of pregnancy, most notably an unwanted one, it is not 
necessarily true of al experiences of pregnancy.9 It is only if the agency of the pregnant 
woman is discounted that the distinction of being in or out of the womb, as a determining 
factor of selfhood, is deemed irrelevant. An incorporation into the law of an understanding 
of a woman and the foetus she is carying as connected would undoubtedly affect the 
premise of the law on abortion, that is the premise on which it is held to be legal or 
illegal. 10 Because abortion law is premised on abstract individualism, it is illegal. 
Feminist discourse on reproductive liberalism is bound to an oppressive legal language of 
rights that derives from a masculinist tradition of property rights. The tradition of liberal 
individualism in which these property rights are based does little to protect the rights of 
some individuals against others. More specifically as Raymond states, it is not clear " . .  how 
autonomy or rights can apply to an individual who is a dividual and thus has no designated 
subject" namely women. 1 1  
Feminist Contradictions? 
One might ask however, 'how can feminist theory criticise an approach in terms of rights 
without undermining one of its central normative ideals, the idea of reproductive rights 
and freedom for women?' Can feminists, who have drawn our attention to the socially 
constructed nature of the categories of person or woman now insist on objectively 
drawing the line of the former at foetus? Similarly, can feminists who have insisted on the 
separability of woman and foetus in relation to abortion rights, now argue for the 
inseparability of woman and foetus with the intention of preventing surrogacy contracts? 
I argue, like Laurie Shrage, that such questions only highlight the imperative need, for 
feminists to develop other justificatory strategies for abortion and against surrogacy that 
avoid individualist liberal theory. 12 I agree in part with Rosalyn Diprose when she says 
that there would seem to be an apparent contradiction between feminist arguments that 
claim a proprietal subjectivity in order to secure abortion rights and anti surrogacy 
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arguments that claim surrogacy contracts are illegal on the basis that they deny the 
possible connectedness of woman and foetus. 1 3 However, that contradiction is only really 
apparent where it is seen as necessary to argue each of these positions from the same 
premise. More importantly, I am not claiming interdependence as essential to the 
experience of pregnancy or women in general. I agree with Diprose when she says that to 
do so is to effectively essentialise women. Rather I wish only to recognise connectedness 
as effecting some people's sense of self and subjectivity not all. 
Further, I am actually questioning the appropriateness of proprietal subjectivity not just for 
understanding surrogacy contracts, but also for abortion legislation. In relation to both 
abortion and surrogacy, where the notion of proprietal subjectivity is used by feminists, 
the assumption of atomistic individualism which is in tum premised on a hierarchical 
relation of sex, is maintained. A phallocentric view of the individual is what abortion and 
surrogacy laws are based on. Sexual difference is ignored. It may in fact be more 
appropriate to incorporate some sense of interdependency into abortion law, rather than 
trying to make sense of surrogacy in terms of proprietal subjectivity or bodily ownership. 
As I mentioned previously, it is because abortion law is premised on liberal individualism 
that abortion is illegal in most Australian states. 
Selfhood has not traditionally been seen as a socially constructed ideal that may have been 
used to oppress and constrain people in useful ways. Rather, it is seen as a metaphysical 
fact. The debate over abortion, and the court cases that have shaped its progress, illustrate 
quite clearly just how susceptible selfhood is to being a socially contrived idea, and how it 
is therefore possible that its liberal incarnation, based on bodily ownership, can be seen to 
be disadvantageous to women in their claims to selfhood and citizenship status. 
The depiction of pregnancy as characterised by three stages of development, popularised 
by the trimester argument of Roe v Wade, draws attention to the arbitrariness of relying 
on the biological state of embodiment for a social definition of meaningful life and legal 
personhood. 14 The decision to make the woman and the foetus separate individuals in the 
last trimester of pregnancy actually acknowledges the nonunitary nature of the woman and 
foetus, eliminating the requirement that a legal person be an autonomous embodied 
individual. This would appear to be a negative decision for advocates of pro choice, 
extending rights of proprietal subjectivity to an entity that is not embodied in the liberal 
sense. However, conceptualising the nonunitary nature of the entities involved in 
pregnancy implicitly exposes the inability of the language of individualised rights, based on 
bodily integrity, to cover all the guises in which persons appear. 1 5 Ironically, then, the 
argument for foetal personhood actually highlights the idea that the proprietal notion of 
individualism is only one of many possible conceptions of what constitutes a legal subject. 
Conclusion 
I have endeavoured to illustrate two problems for feminists utilising the liberal 
construction of bodily integrity as proprietal subjectivity as the basis for arguments about 
abortion and surrogacy. I have aimed to illustrate the problems for women associated with 
5 1  
a profoundly limited conception of self and bodily integrity as exists in liberal 
individualism. I have also indicated the need to open up legal and feminist discourses to 
alternative conceptions of the self through a consideration of abortion and surrogacy. 
Feminist discourse of this kind may actually represent a departure from the limitations of 
essentialism, whereby women's nature is defined, and egalitarianism, whereby unique and 
exclusive female experiences are ignored. Where women can begin to define their own 
understandings of subjectivity and their implications for personhood there may be equal 
protection before the law. A woman who desires her pregnancy may not experience it as 
bodily invasion but as bodily alteration, where the alterations of bodily reality are mirrored 
by alterations of personhood" . 16  Where this may be the case, it is ineffective to argue for 
abortion and against surrogacy on the basis of a proprietal relationship to one's body, for 
this may not be the experience of the body that makes sense of such demands. 
ENDNOTES 
1 .  J. Locke, John Locke: Two Treatise of Government, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1960, p 328 . 
2. M. Lyndon. Shanley, '" Surrogate mothering'  and women's freedom: A critique of contracts for human 
reproduction", Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol. 1 8 ,  No. 3, 1993, p 4. 
3. C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, Stanford University Press, California, 1988, p 1 9 1 .  
4. Pateman, p 206. 
5. Pateman, p 206. 
6. Shanley, Signs, p 2. 
7. Shanley, Signs, p 2. 
8. R. Pollack Petchesky, "Reproductive freedom: Beyond 'A woman's right to choose"' , in Woman: Sex and Sexuality, 
Stimpson, C. & Sector Person, E. (eds) , University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1 980, p 100. 
9. M. Ashe, "Law-language of maternity: Discourse holding nature in contempt", New England Law Review, vol. 22, 
1 988,  p 540. 
10. R. Graycar & J. Morgan. The Hidden Gender of Law, The Federation Press, New South Wales, 1990, p 230. 
1 1 .  J. Raymond, Women as Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the Battle Over Women's Freedom, Spinifex, 
Melbourne, 1993, 
p 1 89.  Emphasis added. 
12.  L. Shrage, Moral Dilemmas of Feminism: Prostitution, Adultery and Abortion, Routledge, New York, 1 994, p 56.  
13 .  R. Diprose, The Bodies of Women: Ethics, Embodiment and Sexual Difference, Routledge, London, 1 994. 
14.  M. Poovey, "The abortion question and the death of man", in Feminists Theorise the Political, Butler, J. & Scott, 
J. (eds) ,  Routledge, New York, 1 992, p 248 .  
1 5 .  Poovey, Feminists Theorise the Political, p 247 . 
1 6. Ashe, New England Law Review, p 550. 
52 

